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  INTRODUCTION   
On July 20, 1787, in the course of a lengthy debate in the 
Constitutional Convention over whether the president ought to 
be subject to impeachment, Benjamin Franklin made a re-
markable argument in the affirmative. 
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History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate being formal-
ly brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst this as uncon-
stitutional. What was the practice before this in cases where the chief 
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to as-
sassination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life but of the op-
portunity of vindicating his character. It wd. be the best way there-
fore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the 
Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honora-
ble acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.1 
That is, Franklin, recognizing that presidents might sometimes 
“render [themselves] obnoxious,” recommended a formal, con-
stitutional mechanism for bringing them to justice instead of 
what he saw as the inevitable alternative: assassination. Or, to 
put it differently, impeachment was an attempt to domesticate, 
to tame, assassination. 
What are we to make of this claim? I suggest that it can 
shed light on one of the more vexing questions surrounding im-
peachment: just what is an impeachable offense? Some have 
suggested that, in the words of then-Congressman Gerald Ford, 
“an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of 
Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in histo-
ry,” provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.2 But 
this sits uncomfortably with the Constitution’s use of the word-
ing “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors”3—a phrase that sounds in legal standards.4 Indeed, the 
Philadelphia Convention originally considered a draft that 
made the president impeachable only “for Treason, or bribery.”5 
George Mason complained that, as treason had a strict consti-
 
 1. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  
 2. 116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970).  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
 4. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
90 (enlarged ed. 1974) (“[T]he Framers, far from proposing to confer illimitable 
power to impeach and convict, intended to confer a limited power.”); id. at 
111–12 (“The last thing intended by the Framers was to leave the Senate free 
to declare any conduct whatsoever a ‘high crime and misdemeanor.’”); Frank 
Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges: An Histor-
ical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 107 (1970) (noting, after surveying im-
peachment trials of federal judges, that “Congressman Ford is in error”). 
Of course, the fact that there are legal standards for impeachment does 
not mean that impeachments are justiciable. See Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993) (holding that impeachments are nonjusticiable); see 
also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 
AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 61–
66 (2007) (arguing that Nixon was correctly decided). 
 5. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499. 
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tutional definition,6 an impeachability provision limited to brib-
ery and treason “will not reach many great and dangerous of-
fenses.”7 Accordingly, he proposed adding “maladministration” 
as a third category of impeachable offenses.8 James Madison, 
however, cautioned that “[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to 
a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”9 Mason then withdrew 
his proposal to add maladministration and suggested instead 
“other high crimes & misdemeanors,” and this proposal was ac-
cepted by the Convention.10 Clearly, this new language was 
meant to be responsive to Madison’s concern—that is, it was 
meant to make it clear that impeachment was to be governed 
by legal standards and not by congressional whim. 
But what should those standards be? The terms “im-
peachment” and “high crimes and misdemeanors” are lifted 
from English law,11 and this history makes it clear that “high 
crimes and misdemeanors” was generally understood as en-
compassing distinctly political offenses.12 But the history of 
English impeachment is of limited utility in discussing Ameri-
can presidential impeachment13 for the simple reason that, at 
 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giv-
ing them Aid and Comfort.”).  
 7. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 550.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. See BERGER, supra note 4, at 57–58.  
 12. See id. at 64; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that impeachable offenses “are 
of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL”). 
 13. As Berger notes, discussion of impeachment at the Founding was fo-
cused almost exclusively on executive impeachment. See BERGER, supra note 
4, at 96, 106, 146–47, 152–53. This emphasis is further highlighted by the lo-
cation of the provision making “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Of-
ficers of the United States”—including judges—impeachable. It comes in Ar-
ticle II, the article establishing the executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
Indeed, the provision originally applied only to the President; the Vice Presi-
dent and other civil officers were added, seemingly as an afterthought, only a 
little more than a week before the Convention adjourned. See 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 552. 
This Article will therefore follow the Founding generation in focusing on 
presidential impeachment. It should be noted, however, that it may make 
sense to have different conceptions of what constitute impeachable offenses 
when considering the impeachment of Presidents, other executive branch of-
ficers, and judges. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT 
PROCESS 106–07 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that different impeachability standards 
may apply to different types of impeachable officers). This follows not only 
from the fact that different sorts of behavior are expected from different sorts 
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English law, the Crown was literally unimpeachable.14 The im-
peachability of the American president thus marks a decisive 
break with English practice, and it is this break that explains 
the attention given to the issue of presidential impeachability 
in both the Philadelphia Convention15 and in the ratification 
debates.16 Indeed, Hamilton specifically pointed to presidential 
impeachability in order to defend the Constitution from the An-
ti-Federalist charge that the president would be as powerful as 
a king. The person of the British King, Hamilton noted, “is sa-
cred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which 
he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national 
revolution.”17 Because the impeachability of the chief magi-
strate was an area in which the American Constitution was 
meant to depart from British practice, and because the im-
peachability of the chief magistrate presents a unique set of is-
sues, potentially justifying a unique substantive standard,18 the 
British practice is of limited interpretive utility.19 
But this does not mean that we have to throw up our hands 
and decide, with Ford,20 that impeachment is lawless. In con-
trast to Ford, I suggest that, in the context of presidential im-
peachment, we accept Franklin’s provocative invitation—an in-
vitation that scholars have thus far ignored21—to view 
 
of officeholders, but also from the constitutional uniqueness of the presidency. 
After all, a misbehaving judge, or even justice, does not constitute in herself 
one of the three coequal branches of government, as the President does. See 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.” (emphasis added)). 
 14. See William Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REG. 641, 
644 (1867). 
 15. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 53–54, 64–69.  
 16. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that the ratifi-
cation debates focused on those aspects of impeachment that “looked innova-
tive or novel, such as presidential impeachment”). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 12, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 18. See supra note 13 and sources cited therein.  
 19. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that preconstitu-
tional impeachment practices are largely irrelevant to constitutional im-
peachment practices “because the framers set forth a special impeachment 
mechanism in the Constitution that reflected their intention to differentiate 
the newly proposed federal impeachment process from the English and state 
experiences with impeachment prior to 1787”).  
 20. See supra text accompanying note 2.  
 21. Franklin’s linkage of impeachment and assassination has occasionally 
been noted by scholars in passing or as a dramatic aside, but it has never been 
unpacked or even taken particularly seriously. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, 
at 104–05; GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 7–8; Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut: 
Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must Be Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 388 
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impeachable offenses as (what might otherwise be) assassina-
ble offenses. On this view, impeachment maintains the link be-
tween removal and death, but attenuates it. Both impeachment 
and assassination deal with a situation in which a chief magi-
strate has rendered himself too obnoxious to be allowed to con-
tinue to rule, but whereas assassination by definition involves 
the death of its object, American impeachment never can.22 Im-
peachment is, instead, a political death—a president who is 
impeached and convicted is deprived of his continued existence 
as a political officeholder. And, like death, impeachment and 
conviction may be permanent.23 
These heretofore unexplored connections suggest that as-
sassinability may appropriately provide the substantive criteria 
for impeachability. But assassination as a means of executive 
removal has significant drawbacks. It is politically disruptive; 
it carries a high risk of irreversible error; and it is, of course, 
violent. American impeachment tames assassination by, in 
Franklin’s word, “regular[izing]”24 it—that is, by proceduraliz-
ing it. The Constitution’s impeachment procedures make the 
removal of the chief magistrate less violent, less disruptive, and 
less error-prone than assassination. Impeachment in the Amer-
ican Constitution is thus a domestication of assassination—
both in the literal sense that it takes a substantive standard 
from elsewhere and imports it into domestic law, and in the fig-
 
(2000); Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex 
Scandals, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 704 n.244 (1999); Jonathan Turley, 
Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 
49 DUKE L.J. 1, 138–39 (1999); Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitu-
tional Primer, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 117, 121 (1998). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment 
shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”). 
 23. See id. (allowing disqualification to future officeholding as a punish-
ment in cases of impeachment). 
The language of political death is, of course, metaphorical—and, like all 
metaphors, the vehicle does not perfectly fit the tenor. An impeached, con-
victed, and disqualified officeholder can still hold state office. See id. (limiting 
disqualification to “any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States” (emphasis added)). Indeed, an impeached, convicted, and disqualified 
officeholder can be elected to Congress. See CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at 280 n.68 
(arguing that Senators and Representatives do not hold “Office[s] of honor, 
Trust or Profit under the United States”). Still, it is the central contention of 
this Article that the vehicle (assassination, death) can shed significant light on 
the tenor (impeachment). 
 24. See supra text accompanying note 1.  
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urative sense that it takes executive removal out of the realm 
of the brutish and brings it into the realm of the civilized. 
These claims, of course, require significantly more elabora-
tion, and that is what the rest of this Article will provide. In the 
following pages, I shall attempt to unpack Franklin’s associa-
tion of impeachment with assassination, using two paradigm 
cases25 that Franklin would have had in mind when he uttered 
those lines in the Philadelphia Convention, as well as two sub-
sequent cases that shed light on the impeachment-
assassination nexus. 
The first two Parts argue that Franklin had the assassina-
tion of Julius Caesar and the trial and execution of Charles I 
centrally in mind when discussing the removal of obnoxious 
chief magistrates. Both Caesar and Charles were tyrants who 
had subverted their countries’ constitutions in ways that un-
dermined republican liberty, and both had prosecuted bloody 
civil wars in the process. Franklin and his compatriots there-
fore believed that Brutus and his coconspirators were justified 
in killing Caesar and that the English regicides were justified 
in killing Charles. But substantive justification is not the end 
of the story; the lack of procedural regularity attendant upon 
both of these political murders posed difficulties for the Found-
ing generation. These Parts, therefore, not only derive a sub-
stantive standard for impeachability from the factors justifying 
assassination, they also point to the ways in which American 
impeachment practice rectifies the procedural flaws evident in 
the Roman and English examples. 
The third and fourth Parts of this Article trace the interac-
tion of these substantive and procedural criteria at two key 
moments in the history of the American presidency. The first 
moment, discussed in Part III, includes the assassination of 
President Lincoln in 1865 and the impeachment and acquittal 
of President Johnson a mere three years later. This Part argues 
that both John Wilkes Booth and Johnson’s Radical Republican 
opponents in Congress were using the correct substantive stan-
dard for removal, but both made mistaken judgments on the 
merits: neither Lincoln nor Johnson was, in fact, behaving ty-
rannically. But while Booth’s unilateral action led to tragic re-
sults, the Radical Republicans’ compliance with the proper con-
stitutional procedures led to the correct outcome. 
 
 25. On the importance of paradigm cases for constitutional interpretation, 
see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 178–95 (2001). 
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The second significant moment, examined in Part IV, is the 
impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton in 1998–1999. 
This Article argues that those favoring impeachment and con-
viction in this case applied the wrong substantive standard. 
They criticized Clinton for “debas[ing]”26 or “defil[ing]”27 the of-
fice of the presidency—in effect, for making it too small. But, 
the focus on assassinability as the substantive standard for im-
peachability allows us to see that impeachment is meant to 
combat precisely the opposite problem. The paradigmatically 
assassinable—and therefore impeachable—chief magistrate is 
one who, like Caesar or Charles, seeks to make the office too 
big, one who seeks to aggrandize his own power. The Senate 
was therefore right to acquit Clinton, and once again, the pro-
cedural mechanisms of impeachment worked to produce the 
correct result. 
The conclusion includes a brief discussion of one American 
president who would have met the standard for impeachment 
laid out in this Article: Richard Nixon. 
I.  CAESAR AND BRUTUS   
A. FRANKLIN AND CAESAR 
When Franklin spoke of executive assassinations, there 
can be little doubt that he had the tumultuous world of Roman 
politics in mind. After all, Rome loomed large in the minds of 
the Founding generation generally,28 as evinced by the pen-
names chosen by both Anti-Federalists (including Brutus,29 Ca-
to,30 and Agrippa31) and Federalists (including Marcus,32 Mark 
 
 26. 145 CONG. REC. 2565 (1999) (statement of Sen. Charles Hagel). 
 27. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE 5 (1998). 
 28. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 53 (rev. ed. 1998) (“The nostalgic image of the Roman 
Republic became a symbol of all [the patriots’] dissatisfactions with the 
present and their hopes for the future.”). 
 29. See Essays of Brutus, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
358, 358–452 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST]. 
 30. See Letters of Cato, reprinted in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 29, at 
101, 101–29.  
 31. See Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in 4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 
29, at 68, 68–116.  
 32. See Marcus, The Interests of this State, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 127, 127–28 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 
BAILYN’S DEBATE]. 
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Antony,33 and, most famously, Publius34). And although the 
Founders were familiar with any number of sources on Roman 
history, the most influential was unquestionably the first-
century A.D. biographer Plutarch.35 Franklin himself was cer-
tainly a devotee of Plutarch. In his Autobiography, he mentions 
that, as a young child, he “read abundantly” in Plutarch’s Lives, 
“and I still think that time spent to great Advantage.”36 And 
when Franklin founded the Library Company of Philadelphia 
in 1731,37 one of the first books he ordered was the Lives.38 
Franklin was also intimately familiar with two prominent 
dramatic adaptors of stories from Plutarch: Shakespeare39—a 
1744 notice in Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette advertised 
“SHAKESPEAR’S PLAYS in 8 Vol. neatly bound. Sold by the 
Printer hereof”40—and Joseph Addison,41 whose 1713 play Cato 
was hugely influential in the colonies generally42 and for 
Franklin in particular.43 
 
 33. See Mark Antony, Slavery “Ought to Be Regreted . . . But It Is Evident-
ly Beyond Our Controul”: A Defense of the Three-Fifths Clause, reprinted in 1 
BAILYN’S DEBATE, supra note 32, at 737, 737–43.  
 34. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 12. 
 35. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15 (2008) (“[T]he Framing generation particularly 
prized the works of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Polybius, and Plutarch, in 
that rising order of esteem.” (emphasis added)); id. at 16 (“Unquestionably the 
most influential Greek work in colonial America and the early republic was Plu-
tarch’s Lives and Morals.”); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 (1985) (“Doubtless the most 
widely read ancient work [in the early republic] . . . was Plutarch’s Lives.”). 
 36. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, in THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER WRITINGS 3, 13 (Kenneth Silverman ed., 1986). 
 37. See WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 103–
04 (2003) (describing the founding of the Library Company of Philadelphia). 
 38. See Albert J. Edmunds, The First Books Imported by America’s First 
Great Library: 1732, 30 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 300, 300 (1906) (listing 
“Plutarch’s Lives in Small Vol.” among the first set of books ordered for the 
library). 
 39. On the importance of Plutarch to Shakespeare, see, for example, Viv-
ian Thomas, Shakespeare’s Sources: Translations, Transformations, and Inter-
textuality in Julius Caesar, in JULIUS CAESAR: NEW CRITICAL ESSAYS 91, 93 
(Horst Zander ed., 2005) (“However many tributaries flowed into Shakespeare’s 
consciousness, the overriding significance of Plutarch is beyond question.”). 
 40. Advertisement, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1744, at 3.  
 41. See Fredric M. Litto, Addison’s Cato in the Colonies, 23 WM. & MARY 
Q. 431, 432 n.2 (1966) (“Addison had modeled his Marcus Cato and Julius 
Caesar quite clearly after Plutarch’s biographies of them.”).  
 42. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 54 (1968) 
(referring to “Addison’s universally popular play Cato”); id. at 80 (referring to 
“that universally popular paean to liberty, Addison’s Cato”); Litto, supra note 
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And central to Plutarch’s Lives—and to Shakespeare’s and 
Addison’s oeuvres, as well44—is the assassination of Julius Cae-
sar. Of course, Caesar is hardly the only of Plutarch’s subjects 
to be assassinated,45 but he is certainly the most frequently as-
sassinated subject: he meets his death in no fewer than four 
Lives.46 (His life, but not his death, also receives extensive 
treatment in three other Lives whose subjects predeceased 
him.)47 Given the centrality of Plutarch to Franklin and his 
contemporaries, and given the centrality of Caesar to Plutarch, 
it is inconceivable that Franklin did not have Caesar in mind 
when he spoke of the assassination of a “chief Magistrate [who 
had] rendered himself obnoxious.”48 It is, therefore, to an ex-
amination of the circumstances surrounding that assassination 
that we must turn if we are better to understand Franklin’s 
meaning. More precisely, it is to an examination of Plutarch’s 
presentation of those circumstances, supplemented by their 
treatment by Addison and Shakespeare, that this Article now 
turns, not because those are the most historically accurate ac-
counts of the relevant events,49 but rather because, as we have 
 
41, at 440–49 (noting the influence of Addison on American patriots in the 
late-colonial period, including Franklin). 
 43. See FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 93–94 (noting that Franklin used a 
quote from Addison’s Cato as an epigraph to the famous journal in which he 
kept track of his attempt to achieve moral perfection); BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 
PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA (1749), 
reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 397, 405–06 (Leonard W. 
Labaree ed., 1961) [hereinafter FRANKLIN PAPERS] (listing Addison among the 
“Classicks” that should be used to teach English to Pennsylvania youths). 
 44. See generally JOSEPH ADDISON, Cato: A Tragedy, in CATO: A TRAGEDY, 
AND SELECTED ESSAYS 1 (Christine Dunn Henderson & Mark E. Yellin eds., 
2004) (dramatizing Cato’s opposition to Caesar); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
JULIUS CAESAR (Yale Univ. Press ann. ed. 2006) (dramatizing the life and 
death of Caesar). 
 45. See James Atlas, Introduction to 1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES, at 
ix, xiv (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden trans., Modern Library 2001) 
(“Few of [Plutarch’s] subjects died in their beds; murder . . . was the order of 
the day.”). For just a sampling of the Roman assassinations in Plutarch, see 
id. at 43 (assassination of Tatius); id. at 321, 324 (assassination of Coriola-
nus); 2 id. at 21 (assassination of Sertorius); id. at 368–69 (assassination of 
Tiberius Gracchus); id. at 440–41 (assassination of Cicero). 
 46. See 2 id. at 239–42 (life of Caesar); id. at 436 (life of Cicero); id. at 
488–89 (life of Antony); id. at 577–83 (life of Brutus).  
 47. See 1 id. at 734–35 (life of Crassus); 2 id. at 106–35 (life of Pompey); 
id. at 303–17 (life of Cato).  
 48. See supra text accompanying note 1.  
 49. They, of course, are not. Addison and Shakespeare (understandably) 
took dramatic liberties, and it would be anachronistic to expect Plutarch to 
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seen above, those were the sources on Caesar that most shaped 
Franklin and his contemporaries. 
B. CAESAR AND BRUTUS 
It is unnecessary to recount here Gaius Julius Caesar’s 
early years or his rise to power. It suffices to note that his as-
cension was swift, rising to the consulship50—Rome’s chief 
magistry—in 59 B.C.,51 at roughly the age of 41.52 He was aided 
in his rise by his alliance with Crassus and Pompey53 (in what 
historians would later call the “First Triumvirate”54) and he 
was strenuously opposed by Cato the Younger,55 who repeated-
ly warned his countrymen that Caesar aimed at tyranny.56 As 
consul, he proposed measures meant not only to win popular 
support for himself, but also to alienate popular support from 
the patricians, who generally opposed him.57 
After his year of consulship was over, Caesar left Rome to 
become Proconsul of Gaul.58 There, he successfully prosecuted 
the wars which were to gain him the reputation as one of the 
foremost military strategists in history, conquering much of 
Europe for the Republic.59 Caesar’s generalship and generosity 
won him a devoted following among his soldiers60 and Caesar 
used the spoils of war to “purchas[e] himself numerous 
friends.”61 In 56 B.C., the Triumvirate agreed that Pompey and 
Crassus were to become consuls and that they were to use their 
consular power to extend Caesar’s governorship of Gaul for 
another five years.62 As Plutarch notes, “[t]his seemed a plain 
conspiracy to subvert the constitution and parcel out the em-
pire” amongst the three of them.63 All other contenders for the 
 
have adhered to twenty-first century historiographical standards. See Atlas, 
supra note 45, at xii (“How accurate are these details? Not very.”). 
 50. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 207.  
 51. ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY, CAESAR: LIFE OF A COLOSSUS 163–64 (2006). 
 52. See id. at 30 (giving Caesar’s birthdate as July 13, 100 B.C.). 
 53. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 107, 207.  
 54. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 51, at 164. 
 55. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 207. 
 56. See id. at 204, 207, 214–15, 284–85, 290–91, 298, 303. 
 57. See id. at 207–08.  
 58. See id. at 208. 
 59. See id. at 209–18. 
 60. See id. at 209. 
 61. Id. at 111. 
 62. Id. at 111, 295. 
 63. Id. at 296.  
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consulship withdrew out of fear, but Cato persuaded his broth-
er-in-law, Lucius Domitius, to contest the consular elections, 
telling him that “the contest now is not for office, but for liberty 
against tyrants and usurpers.”64 As Domitius was proceeding to 
the forum, Pompey’s forces attacked, slaying some of his party 
and wounding others (including Cato) and forcing Domitius to 
withdraw.65 The Triumvirate thus consolidated its power. 
In 54 B.C., Caesar’s daughter Julia, who had married 
Pompey as part of the process of cementing the Triumvirate, 
died in childbirth.66 The next year, Crassus, who, as soon as his 
consulship was over, had departed Rome for a governorship in 
Parthia (present-day northeastern Iran), was killed in battle.67 
These two deaths irrevocably rent the bonds holding the Tri-
umvirate together—as Plutarch noted, only the fear of Crassus 
“had hitherto kept [Caesar and Pompey] in peace.”68 With 
Crassus’s death, “if the one of them wished to make himself the 
greatest man in Rome, he had only to overthrow the other; and 
if he again wished to prevent his own fall, he had nothing for it 
but to be beforehand with him whom he feared.”69 
In 50 B.C., the patrician consul Marcellus, with Pompey’s 
support, moved to deprive Caesar of his command in Gaul.70 
When Caesar resisted, Marcellus ordered Pompey to defend 
Rome against Caesar.71 Upon receiving word of this, Caesar led 
part of his army across the Rubicon, the border between Gaul 
and Italy, thus instigating a civil war.72 
As the Roman statesmen chose sides, Cato sided with 
Pompey as the lesser of two evils.73 Marcus Brutus, Cato’s 
nephew and son-in-law,74 was expected to side with Caesar, as 
Pompey had put his father to death.75 But Brutus, “thinking it 
his duty to prefer the interest of the public to his own private 
feelings, and judging Pompey’s to be the better cause, took part 
 
 64. Id. at 111–12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65. Id. at 112.  
 66. Id. at 215.  
 67. Id. at 113, 218.  
 68. Id. at 218.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 219. 
 71. Id. at 118.  
 72. Id. at 119, 221. 
 73. Id. at 303–05.  
 74. Id. at 573.  
 75. See id. at 574. 
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with him.”76 Pompey and his followers left Rome before Cae-
sar’s arrival, in order to regroup elsewhere.77 When Caesar en-
tered Rome, he was made dictator by a rump Senate,78 consist-
ing of those few senators who had not fled.79 He shortly 
thereafter resigned the dictatorship and “declared himself con-
sul.”80 When the tribune Mettellus tried to prevent him from 
illegally taking money from the public treasury for his own 
purposes, Caesar “replied that arms and laws had each their 
own time; ‘If what I do displeases you, leave the place; war al-
lows no free talking.’”81 When Mettellus again insisted, Caesar 
“in a louder tone, told him he would put him to death if he gave 
him any further disturbance.”82 Mettellus gave in.83 
The next year, Caesar defeated Pompey’s forces at Pharsa-
lia, in central Greece.84 Pompey himself escaped to Egypt, 
where he was murdered by courtiers eager to curry favor with 
Caesar.85 With Pompey’s death, Cato became the commander of 
his remaining forces.86 Cato chose to make his last stand at 
Utica.87 When it was clear that Caesar would overrun the city 
and his compatriots suggested that Cato seek Caesar’s mercy, 
Cato replied, “I would not be beholden to a tyrant for his acts of 
tyranny. For it is but usurpation in him to save, as their 
rightful lord, the lives of men over whom he has no title to 
reign.”88 Or, in Addison’s telling, when Caesar’s emissary De-
cius entered Utica to assure Cato that Caesar would not harm 
him, Cato replied: 
Cato: My life is grafted on the fate of Rome: 
 Would he save Cato? Bid him spare his country. 
 Tell your dictator this: and tell him Cato 
 Disdains a life which he has power to offer. 
 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 303–04.  
 78. Id. at 224.  
 79. See id. at 222 (noting that, before Caesar arrived, “most of the sena-
tors” fled Rome).  
 80. Id. at 224. 
 81. Id. at 223. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 227–29.  
 85. Id. at 132–34. 
 86. Id. at 306.  
 87. Id. at 307–16. 
 88. Id. at 313.  
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Decius:  Rome and her senators submit to Caesar; 
 Her generals and her consuls are no more, 
 Who checked his conquests and denied his triumphs. 
 Why will not Cato be this Caesar’s friend? 
 
Cato: Those very reasons thou has urged forbid it. 
   *  *  * 
Decius: Let [Caesar] but know the price of Cato’s friendship, 
 And name your terms. 
 
Cato: Bid him disband his legions, 
 Restore the commonwealth to liberty, 
 Submit his actions to the public censure, 
 And stand the judgment of a Roman senate: 
 Bid him do this, and Cato is his friend.89 
Caesar declined Cato’s offer, and, after allowing those of his 
compatriots who so desired to flee or surrender,90 Cato fell on 
his sword.91 
Plutarch reports that over half of all Roman citizens per-
ished in the civil war.92 Caesar offered a full pardon to all Ro-
mans who had fought against him, including Brutus and Cas-
sius.93 At the end of the war, Caesar was made dictator-for-life, 
which Plutarch calls “indeed a tyranny avowed, since his power 
was not only absolute, but perpetual too.”94 Moreover, it was no 
secret that Caesar desired to be king.95 Although he declined 
Antony’s attempt to crown him, it was clear he did so only be-
cause accepting the crown would occasion great public discon-
tent.96 Shakespeare’s Casca tells us that, when first offered the 
crown, Caesar refused, though “he would fain have had it.”97 
When Antony offered the crown a second time, Caesar again re-
fused, but “to my / thinking, he was very loath to lay his fingers 
 
 89. ADDISON, supra note 44, at 34–36.  
 90. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 312–13.  
 91. Id. at 315–16.  
 92. Id. at 234.  
 93. Id. at 575.  
 94. Id. at 235.  
 95. Id. at 237; see also SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 1, sc. 2, ll. 79–80 
(Brutus: “What means this shouting? I do fear the people / Choose Caesar for 
their king.”); id. act 1, sc. 3, ll. 86–87 (“[T]hey say the senators tomorrow / 
Mean to establish Caesar as a king . . . .”). 
 96. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 238.  
 97. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 1, sc. 2, l. 239.  
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off it.”98 And when offered a third time, Caesar collapsed in an 
epileptic fit.99 When statues of Caesar were later “found with 
royal diadems on their heads” and the tribunes pulled those di-
adems off and imprisoned those who had saluted Caesar as 
“king,” Caesar turned the tribunes out of office.100 
Indeed, it was Caesar’s desire to be king that ultimately 
convinced Brutus to join the conspirators in assassinating him. 
Shakespeare’s Brutus is clear: “I know no personal cause to 
spurn at him, / But for the general. He would be crowned.”101 
Brutus traced his lineage to Lucius Junius Brutus, the leader 
of the revolt against the Tarquin monarchy in the fourth cen-
tury B.C. and therefore the founder of the Roman Republic.102 
(It should, perhaps, not pass without mention that Junius Bru-
tus’s partner in this endeavor was Publius Valerius,103 under 
whose name Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote The Federalist 
Papers.)104 Plutarch reports that Roman citizens took to writing 
anonymous notes to Brutus reminding him of his familial histo-
ry and prodding him to take up the tyrannicidal mantle.105 
Shakespeare shows the notes firming Brutus’s resolve to act:  
“Brutus, thou sleep’st. Awake, and see thyself. 
Shall Rome, etcetera. Speak, strike, redress! 
Brutus, thou sleep’st: awake!” 
Such instigations have been often dropped 
Where I have took them up. 
“Shall Rome, etcetera.” Thus must I piece it out: 
Shall Rome stand under one man’s awe? What, Rome? 
My ancestors did from the streets of Rome 
The Tarquin drive, when he was called a king. 
“Speak, strike, redress!” Am I entreated 
To speak and strike? O Rome, I make thee promise: 
If the redress will follow, thou receivest 
Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus!106 
 
 98. Id. ll. 240–41.  
 99. Id. ll. 241–55.  
 100. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 238.  
 101. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 2, sc. 1, ll. 11–12. 
 102. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 572.  
 103. 1 id. at 129  
 104. See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, 
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 41 (1994).  
 105. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 578 (noting that letters reading 
“You are asleep, Brutus,” and “You are not a true Brutus” were left for him). 
 106. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 2, sc. 1, ll. 46–58.  
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And Plutarch reports that Cassius told Brutus that, from him, 
the Romans expected “as an hereditary debt, the extirpation of 
tyranny.”107 It was such considerations that won Brutus over to 
the conspirators’ cause, and it was Brutus’s participation that 
won others over.108 
Immediately after the deed was done on the Ides of March, 
44 B.C., Brutus and his co-conspirators “marched up to the cap-
itol, in their way showing their hands all bloody, and their 
naked swords, and proclaiming liberty to the people.”109 The 
Senate quickly passed an act of oblivion, providing a legal am-
nesty for Caesar’s friends and assassins alike, in the hopes of 
avoiding any further bloodshed.110 But, of course, the concord 
was not to last: Octavius Caesar—Julius Caesar’s nephew and 
adopted son—joined with Antony and Lepidus (in what would 
come to be called the “Second Triumvirate”111), and they pur-
sued and made war on the conspirators.112 At Philippi, they 
won a decisive victory over Brutus and Cassius, and Brutus, 
imitating Cato, fell on his sword.113 In time, Octavius overpow-
ered Antony and Lepidus and became the emperor Augustus.114 
The Roman Republic was over. 
C. THE MEANING OF CAESAR FOR FRANKLIN 
Immediately after the death of Caesar, Shakespeare’s Cas-
sius and Brutus offer a self-referential bit of metacommentary: 
Cassius: How many ages hence 
 Shall this our lofty scene be acted over 
 In states unborn and accents yet unknown! 
 
Brutus: How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport, 
 That now on Pompey’s basis lies along 
 No worthier than the dust! 
 
 
 
 107. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 578.  
 108. See id. at 579–80 (noting that “the most and best” Romans were won 
over to the conspiracy “by the name of Brutus”).  
 109. Id. at 584.  
 110. Id.  
 111. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 51, at 164–65. 
 112. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 586–609.  
 113. Id. at 596–608.  
 114. See WERNER ECK, THE AGE OF AUGUSTUS 39, 49–50 (Deborah Lucas 
Schneider trans., Blackwell Publishing 2003). 
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Cassius: So oft as that shall be, 
 So often shall the knot of us be called 
 The men that gave their country liberty.115 
Cassius is wrong, of course, that posterity would see the assas-
sins as bringers of liberty, for Roman republican liberty was 
never to be restored. But subsequent political thought has in-
deed reenacted, reinterpreted, and reimagined the assassina-
tion of Caesar in states unborn and accents unknown to first-
century B.C. Romans. And while some subsequent interpreters 
have seen Caesar as a victim and Brutus as the paradigmatic 
traitor,116 Franklin and his compatriots clearly thought that it 
was Caesar himself, rather than Brutus and his co-
conspirators, who was responsible for the end of the Roman 
Republic. As Bernard Bailyn has noted, American colonists in 
the 1760s and 1770s “found their ideal selves, and to some ex-
tent their voices, in Brutus, in Cassius, and in Cicero.”117 And 
Carl Richard has written that “[t]he founders’ principal Roman 
heroes were Cato the Younger, Brutus, Cassius, and Cicero, 
statesmen who had sacrificed their lives in unsuccessful at-
tempts to save the republic in its expiring moments.”118 Frank-
lin, a self-avowed lifelong foe of tyranny,119 noted that Caesar 
“undid his Country,”120 and, in verse, compared him unfavora-
bly to Codrus, the eleventh-century B.C. Athenian king who 
sacrificed his life for his country: 
 
 
 115. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 3, sc. 1, ll. 111–18.  
 116. See, e.g., DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO, Canto 34, ll. 64–68, at 537 (Rob-
ert M. Durling ed. & trans., 1996) (portraying Brutus and Cassius as receiving 
the second-worst punishments in hell, after only Judas); 2 BERNARD SHAW, 
DRAMATIC OPINIONS AND ESSAYS WITH AN APOLOGY 398 (1907) (describing 
Caesar as a “great man” and his assassins as a “pitiful gang of mischief-
makers”); LAURYN HILL, Forgive Them Father, on THE MISEDUCATION OF 
LAURYN HILL (Ruffhouse Records 1998) (“Like Cain and Abel, Caesar and 
Brutus, Jesus and Judas, / Backstabbers do this.”). 
 117. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 26 (enlarged ed. 1992). 
 118. RICHARD, supra note 104, at 57; see also id. at 91 (“The founders’ 
greatest villain was Julius Caesar.”). 
 119. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 21 n.* (“I fancy [my brother’s] 
harsh & tyrannical Treatment of me, might be a means of impressing me with 
that Aversion to arbitrary Power that has stuck to me thro’ my whole Life.”); 
Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood, No. 2, THE NEW-ENGLAND COURANT, 
Apr. 16, 1722, at 1, reprinted in 1 FRANKLIN PAPERS (1959), supra note 43, at 
11, 13 (writing, as “Silence Dogood,” that “I am . . . a mortal Enemy to arbi-
trary Government and unlimited Power”). 
 120. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD IMPROVED (1750), reprinted in 3 
FRANKLIN PAPERS, supra note 43, at 437, 453 (emphasis omitted).  
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For’s Country Codrus suffer’d by the Sword, 
And, by his Death, his Country’s Fame restor’d; 
Caesar into his Mother’s Bosom bare 
Fire, Sword, and all the Ills of civil War: 
Codrus confirm’d his Country’s wholesome Laws; 
Caesar in Blood still justify’d his Cause.121 
And Franklin made clear his admiration for Caesar’s opponents 
when he rhetorically asked, “who is greater than Cato?”122 The 
answer, for him, was no one. 
But if the Founders, including Franklin, “revered Caesar’s 
assassins Brutus and Cassius,”123 then it remains to be asked 
what, precisely, were Caesar’s crimes that justified the assassi-
nation. Broadly, they can be broken down into two categories: 
the instigation of civil war and the destruction of republican in-
stitutions. As noted above, Plutarch reports that more than half 
of Rome’s citizenry died in the war begun by Caesar’s crossing 
of the Rubicon.124 Addison has Portius, Cato’s son, remark: 
Already Caesar 
Has ravaged more than half the globe, and sees 
Mankind grown thin by his destructive sword: 
Should he go further, numbers would be wanting 
To form new battles, and support his crimes. 
Ye gods, what havoc does ambition make 
Among your works!125 
Addison’s Cato himself notes that the deaths have not merely 
been casualties of war, but political killings, as well: “’Tis Cae-
sar’s sword has made Rome’s senate little, / And thinned its 
ranks.”126 
And this points to the second, and perhaps greater, of Cae-
sar’s crimes: his subversion of the Roman constitution, and 
thereby of Roman liberty. Plutarch’s Brutus made clear his un-
derstanding of republican liberty when he criticized Cicero for 
adhering to Octavius. Brutus said that, 
in writing and speaking so well of [Octavius] Caesar, he showed that 
his aim was to have an easy slavery. “But our forefathers,” said Bru-
tus, “could not brook even gentle masters.” Further he added, that for 
 
 121. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD (1739), reprinted in 2 FRANKLIN 
PAPERS (1960), supra note 43, at 217, 220.  
 122. Benjamin Franklin, The Busy-Body, No. 3, AM. WKLY. MERCURY, Feb. 
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 126. Id. at 37.  
  
364 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:347 
 
his own part he had not as yet fully resolved whether he should make 
war or peace; but as to one point he was fixed and settled, which was, 
never to be a slave.127 
In this, Brutus expresses what later political theorists would 
call “liberty as non-domination”128—that is, the idea that one is 
unfree if another has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in 
that person’s range of choices.129 What is unique about this re-
publican conception of liberty is that one who lives under an 
arbitrary power is unfree even if that arbitrary power is never 
actually exercised.130 For the republican, “liberty is always cast 
in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and 
slave,”131 and “slavery is essentially characterized by domina-
tion, not by actual interference.”132 This means that “no matter 
how permissive the lord is, the fact of depending on his grace 
and favour, the fact of living under his domination, entails an 
absence of freedom.”133 In Brutus’s words, freedom entails a re-
fusal to brook even gentle masters. 
Because those who operate the levers of power must have 
the authority to interfere in the choices of others,134 republican 
liberty can be established only where that interference cannot 
be arbitrary. That is, the rulers themselves must be con-
strained by law. To put it differently, republican government 
must be constitutional government. Where law no longer con-
strains the rulers, republicanism degenerates into tyranny, re-
gardless of how the tyrant actually behaves. 
To his opponents, Caesar’s behavior from an early period 
demonstrated that tyranny was his goal. From using his politi-
cal power and the spoils of war to secure patronage benefits for 
 
 127. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 587.  
 128. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
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 129. See id. at 52 (listing the criteria for domination).  
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and interference without domination.”). 
 131. Id. at 31.  
 132. Id. at 32.  
 133. Id. at 33.  
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his supporters,135 to agreeing with Pompey and Crassus to di-
vide the empire amongst themselves,136 to using intimidation 
and open violence to carry elections,137 Caesar gave every indi-
cation of seeking expansive power even before the civil war, as 
Cato frequently pointed out.138 During the war, Caesar had a 
rump Senate, consisting entirely of those who had not fled upon 
his armed entrance to the city—and therefore presumably were 
his friends and supporters—proclaim him dictator,139 a title 
that he then exchanged on his own authority for consul.140 
When Mettellus, the tribune, objected to certain illegalities, 
Caesar threatened his life.141 After the war, Caesar became dic-
tator-for-life, and sought to become king.142 It was these facts 
that convinced Brutus and his co-conspirators that Caesar 
aimed at becoming—and, by the end, had become—a tyrant. 
Thus, when Lucius urged Addison’s Cato to surrender, Cato 
replied, “Would Lucius have me live to swell the number / Of 
Caesar’s slaves, or by a base submission / Give up the cause of 
Rome, and own a tyrant?”143 Or, as Shakespeare’s Brutus tells 
the assembled crowd after the deed is done:  
Had you rather Caesar were living and die all 
slaves, than that Caesar were dead, to live all free men? 
   *  *   * 
Who is here  
so base that would be a bondman?144 
The repetition of the language of slavery is not coincidental. By 
discarding the Roman constitution—by casting off all legal con-
straints on his own action—Caesar had destroyed Roman liber-
ty. Under Caesar’s tyranny, all Romans were reduced to the 
status of slaves, without regard to the harshness or mildness of 
Caesar’s actual rule. 
 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 60–61.  
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 62–63. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.  
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 139. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.  
 140. See supra text accompanying note 80.  
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 142. See supra text accompanying notes 94–100. 
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Franklin and his compatriots’ lionization of the assassins, 
then, made it clear that they agreed that tyranny—that is, the 
subversion of the republican constitution and the exercise of 
power unconstrained by law—as well as the initiation of a 
bloody civil war for personal gain, justified an assassination. 
And adding to the credibility of the assassins was that they 
acted openly. Rather than assassinate Caesar in the night, or 
poison him, they assaulted him in the Senate. Immediately af-
terward, they marched through the streets, with his blood still 
on their clothes, declaring and justifying their actions.145 Much 
as Franklin and his colleagues had recently done with regard to 
another radical political act, Caesar’s assassins showed “a de-
cent respect to the opinions of mankind” by submitting their 
“Facts . . . to a candid world.”146 By acting openly, the conspira-
tors asserted that they acted in the public interest, and they 
invited the polity to debate whether their judgment of the pub-
lic interest was correct.147 For American patriots of Franklin’s 
generation, it was. 
But, of course, the fact that these were assassinable of-
fenses under the circumstances does not mean that the institu-
tional arrangement necessitating assassination was ideal. For 
Franklin, Caesar deserved to be removed, and assassination 
was the only way open to Brutus to remove him; but this does 
not make assassination a good political tool, for several rea-
sons. First, the assassination was ineffective in restoring liber-
ty—after another bloody civil war, the Second Triumvirate 
came to power. Octavius gradually overpowered his colleagues, 
until he was able to go further than Caesar ever did in the di-
rection of tyranny, becoming the emperor Augustus. The assas-
sination of Caesar did not bring back republican Rome. Second 
is what might be called the epistemic humility point: not every 
assassin will be a Brutus; indeed, as we shall see, some will be 
John Wilkes Booths.148 If someone mistakenly thinks that a rul-
er has crossed the line into tyranny and therefore assassinates 
that ruler, then the assassin has committed both a terrible in-
 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 109.  
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justice and a highly disruptive political act. Franklin made 
clear his concern with this aspect of assassination when he 
noted that it deprives its object not only of his life, but also “of 
the opportunity of vindicating his character,”149 and that it pro-
vides no opportunity “for his honorable acquittal when he 
should be unjustly accused.”150  
What Franklin sought was a mechanism with both the 
substantive reach of assassination and the procedural mechan-
isms to satisfy these concerns. He sought to “regular[ize]”151 as-
sassination—that is, to tame it—by proceduralizing it. Like as-
sassination, impeachment would remove “chief Magistrate[s 
who had] rendered [themselves] obnoxious”152 by doing things 
like starting civil wars or subverting the constitution. But un-
like assassination, impeachment would be epistemically hum-
ble—it would allow for the acquittal and vindication of the in-
nocent—and it would be less disruptive to the polity, making it 
less likely to provoke the kind of backlash that led to the rise of 
Augustus. 
However, the one example of proceduralized justice for a 
chief magistrate available to Franklin was not without its own 
problems, as we shall see in the next Part. 
II.  CHARLES I AND THE REGICIDES; BUCKINGHAM AND 
FELTON   
A. FRANKLIN AND CHARLES 
When Franklin referred to “one example only of a first 
Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice” which 
“[e]very body cried out agst . . . as unconstitutional,”153 he un-
doubtedly had in mind the trial and execution of Charles I in 
1649.154 The reign of the Stuarts was a well-recognized caution-
ary tale for those who, like Franklin, were active in colonial 
politics. Indeed, as Jack Greene has shown, eighteenth-century 
colonial legislative behavior was “deeply rooted” in seven-
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teenth-century parliamentary opposition to the Stuarts.155 Co-
lonial familiarity with the Stuart reign was so “vivid” that “co-
lonial legislators had a strong predisposition to look at each 
governor as a potential Charles I or James II, to assume a hos-
tile posture toward the executive, and to define with the broad-
est possible latitude the role of the lower house as ‘the main 
barrier of all those rights and privileges which British subjects 
enjoy.’”156 As a man who was both unusually well-read and un-
usually active in colonial politics, Franklin would of course 
have been deeply familiar with the history of conflict between 
the Stuarts and Parliament. Franklin’s lifelong and oft-stated 
hatred of tyranny157 would almost certainly have taken Charles 
I and James II as paradigm cases of tyranny writ large. 
Franklin had no shortage of reading matter to familiarize 
himself with the reign of the Stuarts. Like others active in co-
lonial politics, Franklin would have been familiar with John 
Rushworth’s eight-volume Historical Collections, which was 
largely devoted to Charles’s reign,158 as well as with the collec-
tion of State Trials, first published in 1719, which included the 
trial of Charles I.159 In his Autobiography, Franklin notes that 
he acquired his uncle’s collection of “all the principal Pamphlets 
relating to Public Affairs from 1641 to 1717;”160 clearly the Civil 
War and the trial and execution of Charles I would have been 
the principal focus of the earlier pamphlets in this collection. In 
addition to these primary sources, Franklin was also familiar 
with any number of historians of the period, including both 
Whig historians, like Paul de Rapin-Thoyras161 and Catherine 
 
 155. See JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL 
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189–90 (1994).  
 156. Id. at 199 (quoting LAWRENCE H. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY: 
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, 1689–1763, at 87 (1968) (quoting a 
1728 address of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Lieutenant Governor)).  
 157. See supra note 119. 
 158. See GREENE, supra note 155, at 194 (noting the familiarity of colonial 
legislators with the Historical Collections). 
 159. See Trial of Charles I, in 1 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF STATE-
TRYALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND 
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE 
FOURTH, TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE 510 (Thomas Salmon ed., 
London, Goodwin et al. 1719). For ease of reference, I shall hereinafter refer to 
the version published in Howell’s State Trials in the early-nineteenth century. 
See infra notes 240, 286–305. 
 160. FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 6. 
 161. Among the first books ordered for Franklin’s Library Company of 
Philadelphia was Rapin’s History of England. See Edmunds, supra note 38, at 
300 (noting the order placed for “Rapin’s History of England. 12 Vol’.” in octavo). 
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Macaulay,162 and Tory historians, like David Hume163 and Lord 
Clarendon.164  
Thus, when Franklin thought about the removal of an ob-
noxious executive, his mind naturally turned to Charles I, and 
the “formal[]” way in which he was “brought to public Jus-
tice.”165 In order to understand what Franklin found both ap-
pealing and upsetting about the proceedings against Charles, it 
will help to examine those proceedings, and certain political 
controversies surrounding them, in detail. As in the previous 
Part, this Part will rely primarily on sources, like those dis-
cussed above, that were available to Franklin and his contem-
poraries. 
B. CHARLES, BUCKINGHAM, AND FELTON 
It is unnecessary to rehearse here the litany of complaints 
that began accumulating against Charles I even before he as-
sumed the throne in 1625. After first unsuccessfully attempting 
a deeply unpopular marriage match with the (Catholic) Span-
ish Infanta,166 he ultimately concluded an only slightly less un-
popular marriage with the (Catholic) Princess Henrietta Maria 
 
 162. Franklin listed Macaulay among the writers of “true History.” See 
Benjamin Franklin, “A Traveller”: News-Writers’ Nonsense, PUB. ADVERTISER, 
May 22, 1765, reprinted in 12 FRANKLIN PAPERS (1968), supra note 43, at 132, 
135. Macaulay and Franklin socialized in Paris in the 1770s. See Letter from 
Catherine Macaulay to Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 8, 1777), in 25 FRANKLIN 
PAPERS (William B. Wilcox ed., 1986), supra note 43, at 264, 264–65 (apologiz-
ing for not having seen Franklin recently, but noting, “[y]ou are very sensible 
that the suspenssion of the Habeas Corpus Act subjects me to an immediat 
imprisonment on any suspicion of my having held a correspondence with your 
Countrymen on this side the Water . . . . I am now nursing my constitution to ena-
ble me to treat largely on our fatal civil wars in the History I am now about”). 
 163. When Franklin lived in London in the late 1750s and early 1760s, he 
cultivated a friendship with Hume, who was at the time completing his Histo-
ry of England. See ISAACSON, supra note 37, at 196–97 (describing Franklin’s 
friendship with Hume); see also Franklin, “A Traveller,” supra note 162, at 135 
(listing Hume among the writers of “true History”). 
 164. In 1738, Franklin placed an ad in his Pennsylvania Gazette which 
read, “Lent and Lost, the Earl of Clarendon’s History of the Rebellion and Civ-
il Wars, Vol. I. . . . Whoever brings it to the Printer hereof, shall be handsome-
ly rewarded.” Advertisement, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1738, reprinted in 2 
FRANKLIN PAPERS (1960), supra note 43, at 216, 216. 
 165. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.  
 166. See JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE 
PASSAGES OF STATE. WEIGHTY MATTERS IN LAW. REMARKABLE PROCEEDINGS 
IN FIVE PARLIAMENTS. BEGINNING THE SIXTEENTH YEAR OF KING JAMES, 
ANNO 1618. AND ENDING THE FIFTH YEAR OF KING CHARLS, ANNO 1629, at 
76–103 (London, Newcomb 1659) (describing the trip to Spain); id. at 119–26 
(reprinting Buckingham’s narrative of the trip). 
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of France.167 The new Anglo-French alliance went to war 
against the Habsburg rulers of Spain and Austria, a war that 
went badly from the beginning.168 And the alliance with the 
French, beset with mutual jealousy and suspicion from its in-
ception,169 became intolerable to many Englishmen when bor-
rowed English ships were used to attack fellow Protestants, the 
Huguenots at La Rochelle.170 Of course, these expeditions were 
costly, and when Parliament demanded the redress of certain 
grievances as a condition for granting supply to the Crown, 
Charles dissolved Parliament and unconstitutionally relied on 
prerogative taxation.171 This naturally generated further dis-
content. And at the center of public and parliamentary unhap-
piness was the Duke of Buckingham. 
George Villiers, the first Duke of Buckingham, had risen 
from obscurity to become the court favorite of James I.172 In 
what can only be described as a remarkable feat of political 
dexterity, he managed to retain and further consolidate his sta-
tus as favorite when Charles came to the throne.173 It was, 
therefore, inevitable that popular dissatisfaction with the 
course of royal government would fall on Buckingham’s shoul-
ders, especially given the legal maxim that “the king can do no 
wrong.”174 Moreover, Buckingham’s position as Lord Admiral 
 
 167. See 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE INVASION 
OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 159–60 (LibertyClassics 
1983) (1778) (noting that the increasingly powerful “puritanical party” disliked 
the match with France and the promise to tolerate Catholicism that Charles 
had agreed to as part of the marriage treaty); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 
168–69 (noting the marriage). 
 168. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 166 (noting the disaster of the Cadiz 
expedition); 10 M. DE RAPIN THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 33–34 (N. 
Tindal trans., London, Knapton 1730) (same); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 
196 (same); id. at 152–54 (noting the disaster of the Austrian expedition under 
the command of Count Mansfield). 
 169. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 163. 
 170. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 15; RUSHWORTH, supra note 
166, at 174–76. 
 171. Charles’s relationship with his Parliaments is discussed in depth in 
Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1083, 1100–16 (2009).  
 172. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 61 (noting that Villiers, “a youth of 
one-and-twenty, younger brother of a good family” first came to James’s atten-
tion); id. at 63–64 (recounting Villiers’s rapid rise through the hierarchy of 
honors under James). 
 173. See 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 1–2 (noting the continuity 
of Buckingham’s influence). 
 174. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254–55 (“That the king 
can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principal of the English con-
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gave him command responsibility for the fate of the English 
fleet.175 In the very first year of Charles’s reign, the House of 
Commons “loudly complained” about Buckingham’s part in al-
lowing the French to use English ships at La Rochelle.176 Hume 
speculates that “spleen and ill-will against the duke of Buck-
ingham” were largely responsible for the failure of Charles’s 
first Parliament to vote him the funds he sought.177 
But the rising costs of Charles’s military plans forced him 
to call a new Parliament in 1626 in the hopes that it would be 
more generous than its predecessor.178 The new House of 
Commons “fell upon the Duke, as the chief cause of all publick 
Miscarriages,”179 and soon reported thirteen articles of im-
peachment against Buckingham, accusing him of everything 
from procuring too many offices for himself and for others in 
the development of a large patronage network, to failing, in his 
capacity as Lord Admiral, to defend the seas adequately, to de-
livering ships to the French to be used against La Rochelle, to 
embezzling Crown money and lands, to playing a role in 
James’s death by keeping medicine from him on his sickbed.180 
The truth of any particular of these accusations is immaterial; 
what matters for the purposes of the present discussion is that 
Buckingham’s enemies—a class which included an increasingly 
large percentage of the English population181—believed them. 
Charles immediately had the Commons’s two impeachment 
managers, Sir Dudley Digges and Sir John Elliott, imprisoned 
in the Tower.182 This served only to enrage the House further, 
and Charles was forced to back down and release them.183 
 
stitution: meaning only . . . [that] whatever may be amiss in the conduct of 
public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king; nor is he, but his mini-
sters, accountable for it to the people . . . .”); 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 291 
(“The king, by the maxims of law, could do no wrong: His ministers and ser-
vants, of whatever degree, in case of any violation of the constitution, were 
alone culpable.”).  
 175. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 308. 
 176. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 15–16.  
 177. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 158. For more on Charles’s struggles with 
the 1625 Parliament over money, see Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1101–02. 
 178. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 198.  
 179. Id. at 217.  
 180. See 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 71–72 (giving an “abstract” 
of the charges); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 302–53 (laying out and elabo-
rating upon the articles of impeachment).  
 181. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 168 (noting that Buckingham “became 
every day more unpopular”).  
 182. Id. at 171.  
 183. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 74–75.  
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Charles then sent a letter to the House, reminding it that 
he was still in need of funds, and demanding an immediate 
grant of supply. Any further delay, he wrote, would be regarded 
as tantamount to an outright denial of funds.184 As Rapin 
notes, this was obviously “an Artifice to evade” Buckingham’s 
trial—by demanding an immediate vote of funds, Charles could 
dissolve or prorogue Parliament as soon as they were granted 
and before the Lords could try Buckingham.185 The House did 
not cooperate; instead, it prepared a remonstrance against 
Buckingham, demanding his removal and attacking Charles’s 
reliance on prerogative taxation, particularly the customs du-
ties of tonnage and poundage.186 Before the remonstrance could 
be presented, the King dissolved Parliament, accusing the 
House of Commons of neglecting public business in its drive to 
punish Buckingham.187 If they were not going to give the King 
the money he sought, he certainly had no intention of waiting 
around for them to convict his royal favorite. As Rapin puts it, 
“[n]o body doubted but the Duke of Buckingham’s Interest was 
the sole Cause of this Dissolution.”188 
After the dissolution of this Parliament, Charles relied 
even more heavily on unconstitutional prerogative taxation.189 
Even Hume, an historian otherwise relatively sympathetic to 
Charles, describes this taxation as “a violation of liberty 
[which] must, by necessary consequence, render all parliaments 
superfluous.”190 As a result, “[i]t may safely be affirmed, that, 
except a few courtiers or ecclesiastics, all men were displeased 
with this high exertion of prerogative, and this new spirit of 
administration.”191 Rather than rein in his spending, Charles 
chose this moment to begin a war with France by sending an 
 
 184. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 390–91.  
 185. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 79. The Lords were in the 
midst of their own battle with the King, over the imprisonment of the Earl of 
Arundel, and there was every likelihood that they would visit their displeas-
ure at the state of royal government on Buckingham’s head. See Chafetz, su-
pra note 171, at 1104–06 (discussing the dispute over Arundel’s imprisonment). 
 186. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 398, 400–06. On the long-running 
battle between Charles and his Parliaments over tonnage and poundage, see 
Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1101–02, 1106–12.  
 187. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 398, 410. 
 188. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 84. 
 189. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 176–80 (describing the levying of ship 
money and forced loans).  
 190. Id. at 177.  
 191. Id. at 181.  
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expedition in relief of the Huguenots at La Rochelle.192 Hume 
notes that “[a]ll authentic memoirs, both foreign and domestic, 
ascribe to Buckingham’s counsels this war with France,”193 and 
he asserts that Buckingham’s motive was his passion for the 
French Queen.194 Buckingham was commissioned to lead the 
expedition himself.195 When the fleet arrived at La Rochelle, 
the Huguenot inhabitants refused to admit the soldiers into the 
city.196 Buckingham withdrew to the nearby Île de Ré. The in-
eptitude of Buckingham’s siege of the French fort on Ré allowed 
the French to land reinforcements.197 The result was a “total 
rout” in which Buckingham lost two-thirds of his forces,198 and 
he returned home to “a world of Complaints and Murmurs 
against” him.199 Moreover, the expense of the Rochelle expedi-
tion exceeded what could be raised even through unconstitu-
tional prerogative taxation, leaving Charles under the necessity 
of calling a new Parliament, his third, in 1628.200 
This Parliament assembled in a confrontational mood, re-
fusing to act on Charles’s demands for funds until its griev-
ances were redressed.201 These grievances took the form of the 
Petition of Right,202 to which Charles was forced to assent early 
in the new Parliament.203 The Petition complained of the exac-
tion of forced loans and prerogative taxation, of imprisonments 
without due process, of the forced quartering of soldiers and 
sailors, and of the imposition of martial law.204 In debating the 
Petition, Sir Francis Seymour expressed the sentiments of the 
House when he thundered that “he is not a good subject, he is a 
slave, who will allow his goods to be taken from him against his 
 
 192. See id. at 181–82, 184–85. 
 193. Id. at 182.  
 194. Id. at 182–84.  
 195. Id. at 185. 
 196. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 122–23.  
 197. Id. at 123; 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 185.  
 198. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 185; see also 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra 
note 168, at 124. 
 199. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 125. 
 200. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 187.  
 201. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 499 (noting that the first day of 
the new Parliament “was spent in opening the grievances and state of the 
Kingdom”).  
 202. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car., c. 1, §§ 1–11 (Eng.).  
 203. On the slightly complicated history of precisely how Charles signified 
his assent to the Petition, see 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 197–200.  
 204. Petition of Right §§ 1–9.  
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will, and his liberty against the laws of the kingdom.”205 And 
the House had no doubts about who was to blame—in the 
words of the venerable Sir Edward Coke, “the Duke of Buck-
ingham is the cause of all our miseries[,] . . . that man is the 
Grievance of Grievances: let us set down the causes of our dis-
asters, and all will reflect upon him.”206 In assenting to the Pe-
tition, Charles agreed to cease the complained of activities; he 
expected that, in return, he would be granted the supply he 
sought to carry out his foreign adventures.207 
But the House was in no mood to be so agreeable. Imme-
diately after Charles’s assent to the Petition, the House passed 
a resolution declaring that “the excessive Power of the Duke of 
Buckingham, is the cause of the Evils and Dangers to the King 
and Kingdom,”208 and began preparing a remonstrance spelling 
out Buckingham’s sins in great detail.209 That remonstrance 
was followed in short order by another decrying the King’s col-
lection of tonnage and poundage without parliamentary autho-
rization and warning him not to do so again.210 Charles imme-
diately prorogued Parliament, citing the remonstrances as the 
cause, even though he had not yet received most of the funds he 
sought.211 
As soon as Parliament was prorogued, Buckingham went 
to Portsmouth, where he was overseeing the outfitting of a new 
fleet to attack the French forces besieging La Rochelle.212 While 
there, on August 23, 1628, he was assassinated by an army 
veteran named John Felton.213 Felton had served under Buck-
ingham as a lieutenant; when his captain died in 1626, he 
hoped for the promotion.214 Instead, the promotion went to 
Henry Hunckes, the nephew of Sir Edward Conway, a secretary 
of state and ally of Buckingham.215 In 1627, when another cap-
 
 205. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 189; see also id. at 190 (quoting Sir Robert 
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 206. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 607.  
 207. See id. at 614–15 (reprinting Charles’s demand for funds, immediately 
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 208. Id. at 617.  
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 211. Id. at 631.  
 212. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 202–03.  
 213. Id. at 203.  
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tain died at Ré (where Felton was wounded), he again lost out 
on the promotion to someone better connected.216 Thus Felton 
twice “fell afoul of Buckingham’s formidable patronage net-
work.”217 Of course, Buckingham’s near monopoly on state of-
fices and his use of them to further entrench himself and his 
friends in power was not merely an obstacle to Felton’s career 
advancement; it was also one of the chief heads of complaint 
against Buckingham throughout the nation.218 Felton and his 
fellow veterans were also owed a substantial amount of back 
pay, and they were increasingly dissatisfied with the delay in 
disbursing that pay.219 But this, too, was merely the private 
side of one of the pervasive public complaints against Bucking-
ham—that he was, both by the expense of the policies he advo-
cated and the lavishness of the gifts he received, bankrupting 
the Crown.220  
Felton was intimately aware of these heads of public com-
plaint against Buckingham. After leaving the army, he im-
mersed himself in the underground world of London opposition 
pamphleteering.221 These pamphlets—and poems and ballads—
not only attacked Buckingham, they increasingly called for his 
assassination.222 One of the most prominent opposition pamph-
lets was written by William Fleetwood, a fellow veteran of the 
Île de Ré. In his account, after the rout he and his comrades 
had decided to assassinate Buckingham, but then changed 
their minds, resolving that “it was only ‘fitt to let him die, by 
the unquestionable hand of Parliament’.”223 Fleetwood there-
fore calls on Parliament “to deliver ‘a revenge upon the Instru-
ment’” of his (and the nation’s) misfortune.224 That is, although 
they first contemplated assassination, they decided instead to 
advocate the domesticated version: impeachment. 
But the problem with impeachment in the British context 
was that the King could prorogue or dissolve Parliament when-
 
 216. Id. at 364–65.  
 217. Id. at 362. 
 218. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 219. See Cogswell, supra note 215, at 369–70, 377–78.  
 220. See supra text accompanying note 180; see also Cogswell, supra note 
215, at 377 (“Charles and Buckingham, however, had decided to concentrate 
their limited cash reserves on mounting the next military effort; this meant that 
Felton and thousands of other officers and men would have to wait for payment.”).  
 221. See Cogswell, supra note 215, at 365–69, 374–77.  
 222. Id. at 364, 366, 369, 374–77.  
 223. Id. at 364 (quoting Fleetwood’s pamphlet).  
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ever he saw fit, thereby preventing the impeachment of anyone 
he wished to protect. After the 1628 parliamentary attack on 
Buckingham—like the 1626 attack—was cut short by the King, 
it became clear to Felton that “there was no legislative solution 
to Buckingham.”225 Indeed, the 1628 parliamentary remon-
strance against Buckingham was hugely influential to Felton; 
he later acknowledged that it was by “reading the remon-
strance of the House of Parliament [that] it came into his mind 
[that] by . . . killing the Duke he should do his country great 
service.”226 In fact, before killing Buckingham, he had sewn into 
his hat several lines from the remonstrance, intending them to 
serve as explanation and justification in the event that he was 
killed during the attempt.227 
Felton’s single and singular act thus plays out the connec-
tions between impeachment and assassination. Felton felt he 
had been personally injured by the Duke, but he also saw that 
injury to be a personal manifestation of the injuries that Buck-
ingham was perpetrating on the nation. After all, Felton’s inju-
ries were caused by Buckingham’s military ineptitude, his priv-
ileging of patronage connections over merit in doling out state 
offices, and his bankrupting of the nation. And those were three 
of the general heads of complaint against Buckingham, as 
spelled out not only in opposition pamphlets and street ballads, 
but also in frustrated parliamentary impeachment attempts 
and remonstrances. But impeachment, although a more regu-
larized form of assassination, was not regularized enough—it 
could always be frustrated by the will of the King. That is what 
Felton saw and Fleetwood could not. It was at this junction of 
private wrongs, public wrongs, and parliamentary impotence 
that Felton acted. And although he likely acted alone, he was 
widely celebrated as a hero.228 
C. CHARLES AFTER BUCKINGHAM 
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the removal of 
Buckingham from the scene did not, in fact, usher in a new 
spirit of harmony between Charles and his subjects. During the 
1628 prorogation, Charles continued to collect tonnage and 
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poundage without parliamentary approval, leading to a mer-
chant revolt.229 When Parliament reconvened, the Commons re-
fused to grant any further funds, leading Charles to dissolve 
Parliament and resolve to govern without it.230 Meanwhile, La 
Rochelle fell to the besieging French troops,231 and Charles, 
without money and despairing of success, signed peace treaties 
with France in 1629232 and Spain in 1630.233 As Hume notes, 
“[t]he influence of these two wars on domestic affairs, and on 
the dispositions of king and people, was of the utmost conse-
quence: But no alteration was made by them on the foreign in-
terests of the kingdom.”234 In other words, Charles squandered 
huge amounts of blood and treasure—much of it raised uncon-
stitutionally—and utterly alienated the affections of his par-
liaments and his people for no gain whatsoever. 
During Charles’s rule without Parliament, he continued to 
antagonize the increasingly powerful and restive Puritan party, 
particularly in his advancement of William Laud, the Bishop of 
London, whom Charles raised to Archbishop of Canterbury, 
and who was a staunch advocate of high-church Arminian-
ism.235 In addition to the religious strife, there was growing po-
litical resistance to Charles’s “violations, some more open, some 
more disguised, of the privileges of the nation.”236 These in-
cluded the unconstitutional levying of tonnage and poundage 
and ship money without the consent of Parliament237 and the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of Star Chamber.238 What these 
had in common was their extension of royal prerogative at the 
expense of institutions meant to check it. As Hume notes, if 
Charles could levy some taxes without parliamentary consent, 
then “[b]y the same right any other tax might be imposed,”239 
and any need for calling Parliaments would be obviated. Like-
 
 229. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 205–06. 
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wise, by allowing prerogative courts like Star Chamber to 
poach the jurisdiction of the common-law courts, the traditional 
role of the latter as protectors of English liberty was dimin-
ished. And even the common-law courts were subject to royal 
interference, as the infamous verdict in favor of the Crown in 
the 1637 Ship Money Case showed.240 Hume notes that this de-
cision “rouzed [the people] from their lethargy” and convinced 
them “that liberty was totally subverted, and an unusual and 
arbitrary authority exercised over the kingdom. Slavish prin-
ciples, they said, concur with illegal practices; ecclesiastical ty-
ranny gives aid to civil usurpation; iniquitous taxes are sup-
ported by arbitrary punishments.”241 
In the same year as the Ship Money Case, Charles decided 
to introduce a new high-church liturgy into predominantly 
Presbyterian Scotland.242 The Scots rioted, and, as Charles re-
fused to back down, the riots turned into an insurrection, and 
the insurrection turned into a war in 1639.243 With the finan-
cial necessity brought on by the war, Charles could no longer 
avoid calling a Parliament, and the new Parliament assembled 
in April 1640.244 But the new Parliament—which had more 
sympathy for the Scots’ religious scruples than for the King’s 
high-church policies—turned to its grievances before giving any 
thought to supplying the war effort.245 Their grievances fell 
broadly under three heads: “those with regard to privileges of 
parliament, to the property of the subject, and to religion.”246 
Enraged, Charles dissolved this Parliament—known to history 
as the “Short Parliament”—less than a month after it assem-
bled and (in clear violation of parliamentary privilege247) im-
prisoned some of the opposition figures.248 In Rapin’s words, 
“’twas known by Experience, that [Charles] would draw from 
the least Precedent, Consequences destructive of the Liberty of 
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Parliaments, and in fine, the Number of Male-contents was in-
finite.”249 Charles’s coffers, however, were quite finite, and his 
attempts to force a new loan from his subjects were “repelled by 
the spirit of liberty, which was now become unconquerable.”250 
Moreover, the Scottish army had not only defeated Charles’s 
forces in Scotland, it had crossed the English border and taken 
Newcastle.251 Charles quickly negotiated a treaty with the 
Scots that obliged him to pay for the Scottish army’s expenses, 
as well as those of his own army.252 He had no choice but to call 
another Parliament—his last—to raise the necessary funds.253 
In order to placate this new Parliament—later known as 
the “Long Parliament”—Charles sacrificed his new royal favor-
ite, the Earl of Strafford.254 Despite promising Strafford that he 
would support him, Charles assented to the bill of attainder 
passed by both houses of Parliament and allowed Strafford to 
be executed in May 1641.255 Charles must have hoped that by 
allowing Strafford, unlike Buckingham, to feel the wrath of 
parliamentary justice, he would repair his relationship with 
Parliament and the public. As further efforts in that direction, 
Charles consented to abolish Star Chamber and to commission 
common-law judges during good behavior, rather than at the 
pleasure of the Crown.256 But these gestures were in vain. 
When a Catholic rebellion erupted in Ireland, leading to a mas-
sacre of English Protestants,257 the rebels claimed to act under 
Charles’s authority, and Parliament believed them.258 Soon 
thereafter, the House of Commons passed the so-called Grand 
Remonstrance, reciting every grievance from the entirety of 
Charles’s reign—206 enumerated grievances in all.259 In 
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 251. Id. at 279.  
 252. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 452–53. 
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Hume’s apt summary, the House concluded that Charles’s ac-
tions amounted to “a total subversion of the constitution.”260 
With this, the House provoked Charles into a fatal misstep: on 
January 3, 1642, he accused five members of the House of 
Commons and one member of the House of Lords—all of whom 
were leaders of the opposition to the Crown—of treason and 
sought to have them tried before the Lords.261 This led to an es-
calating series of confrontations, the most salient moment of 
which involved Charles’s arrival at the House of Commons with 
an armed guard, demanding that the accused members be 
turned over to him. The public outrage was so extreme that 
Charles was forced to flee London, and the Civil War com-
menced.262 
In March 1642, Parliament passed the Militia Act, taking 
upon itself command authority over the militia.263 Several 
months later, Charles raised his standard at Nottingham,264 
and the Battle of Edgehill followed in October.265 Almost four 
years of bloody fighting ensued, as parliamentary forces gradu-
ally gained the upper hand.266 In May 1646, Charles surren-
dered to Parliament’s Scottish allies; in January 1647, the 
Scots handed him over to the parliamentary forces.267 
Predictably, with the King in custody, tensions between 
Parliament and the army came to the fore. After the army forc-
ibly took custody of the King away from those who were holding 
him pursuant to parliamentary orders,268 the officers, led by 
Oliver Cromwell, debated the question of what to do with 
Charles. Clarendon reports that there were three schools of 
thought: 
Some were for an actual deposing him; which could not but be easily 
brought to pass, since the parliament would vote any thing they 
should be directed: others were for the taking away his life by poison; 
which would make the least noise; or, if that could not be so easily 
contrived, by assassination; for which there were hands enough ready 
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to be employed. There was a third sort, as violent as either of the oth-
er, who pressed to have him brought to a public trial as a malefactor; 
which, they said, would be most for the honour of the parliament, and 
would teach all kings to know, that they were accountable and pun-
ishable for the wickedness of their lives.269 
Hume explains why they settled on the third option: 
To murder him privately was exposed to the imputation of injustice 
and cruelty, aggravated by the baseness of such a crime; and every 
odious epithet of Traitor and Assassin would, by the general voice of 
mankind, be undisputably ascribed to the actors in such a villany. 
Some unexpected procedure must be attempted, which would astonish 
the world by its novelty, would bear the semblance of justice, and 
would cover its barbarity by the audaciousness of the enterprize.270 
On November 20, 1648, the army presented a remonstrance to 
Parliament, the first article of which demanded “[t]hat the King 
be brought to Justice, as the capital Cause of all the Evils in 
the Kingdom, and of so much Blood being shed.”271 But the 
House of Commons decided against giving the army’s remon-
strance “speedy consideration,”272 and instead voted to enter in-
to peace negotiations with the King, based on terms that he 
had proposed to it.273 
This was a concession too far for the army. On December 6, 
1648, Colonel Pride surrounded the House of Commons with 
two regiments and prevented approximately 200 members from 
entering Parliament.274 The event, which came to be known as 
“Pride’s Purge,” left the House dominated by supporters of the 
army.275 The purged House, known to history as the “Rump 
Parliament,” immediately reversed the vote to enter into nego-
tiations with the King, declaring his proposals unacceptable.276 
And on December 23, the House appointed a committee to “re-
ceive all Informations and Examinations of all Witnesses for 
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the matters of Fact against the King, and all other Delin-
quents.”277 
Five days later, the committee reported an ordinance call-
ing for the appointment of commissioners to try Charles for 
high treason.278 On January 1, 1649, the House of Commons 
passed the ordinance, the prologue of which accused Charles of 
having 
had a wicked Design totally to subvert the antient and fundamental 
Laws and Liberties of this Nation, and in their Trade to introduce an 
Arbitrary and Tyrannical Government; and that besides all other evil 
Ways and Means to bring this Design to pass, he hath prosecuted it 
with Fire and Sword, levyed and maintained a cruel War in the Land 
against the Parliament and Kingdom[,] whereby the Country has 
been miserably wasted, the publick Treasure exhausted, Trade de-
cayed, Thousands of People murdered, and infinite other Mischiefs 
committed; for all which high and Treasonable Offenses the said 
Charles Stuart might long since justly have been brought to exem-
plary and condign Punishment.279 
The ordinance also named 150 commissioners—all of them 
staunch antiroyalists, including Oliver Cromwell and Colonel 
Pride—who were to serve as the judges in the “High Court of 
Justice,” which was to try the King.280 The House simulta-
neously resolved that “by the Fundamental Laws of this Realm 
it is Treason in the King of England for the time to come to levy 
War against the Parliament and Kingdom of England.”281 This 
was novel, indeed—the law of treason had theretofore been de-
finitively established by the Treason Act of 1351, which listed 
seven heads of treasonable conduct, none of which included the 
King’s levying war against the Parliament.282 
When the House of Lords refused to consent to these ac-
tions of the Rump House of Commons,283 the Commons unan-
imously resolved that “whatsoever is enacted and declared Law 
by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, hath the 
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force of Law, and all the People of this Nation are included the-
reby, although the consent and concurrence of the King and 
House of Peers be not had thereunto.”284 This was, of course, a 
radical alteration of the English constitution—whereas laws 
had previously needed the consent of Commons, Lords, and 
Crown, now the Commons, on its own authority, was dispens-
ing with the other two. On January 6, the newly supreme 
House of Commons gave its final assent to the ordinance for 
trying the King.285 
D. THE TRIAL OF CHARLES I 
On January 20, 1649, the High Court of Justice assembled 
in Westminster Hall, with John Bradshaw presiding as Lord 
President of the Court.286 In fact, what the Court was to expe-
rience in the coming days was not a trial at all, but rather a se-
ries of arguments about jurisdiction, followed by a default 
judgment against the defendant. First, the Court’s clerk read 
the charge, which accused Charles of making war against Par-
liament and the people 
out of wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and 
tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the 
rights and liberties of the people; yea, to take away and make void the 
foundations thereof and of all redress and remedy of misgovernment, 
which by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom were re-
served on the people’s behalf, in the right and power of frequent and 
successive parliaments.287 
The charge ended by “impeach[ing] the said Charles Stuart, as 
a Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and a public and implacable Ene-
my to the Commonwealth of England.”288 Bradshaw asked 
Charles how he pled.289 Instead of answering, Charles de-
manded to “know by what power I am called hither. . . . I would 
like to know by what authority, I mean lawful; there are many 
unlawful authorities in the world, thieves and robbers by the 
highways; but I would know by what authority I was brought 
[here].”290 He made clear that his appearance could not be con-
strued as consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, as he was brought 
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there by force.291 And he was certain that the jurisdiction could 
not have been vested in the Court by law, as “I see no house of 
lords here that may constitute a parliament; and the king too 
should have been [here].”292 He thus reiterated, “[l]et me see a 
legal authority warranted by the Word of God, the Scriptures, 
or warranted by the Constitutions of the kingdom, and I will 
answer.”293 Bradshaw replied, “we are satisfied with our au-
thority” and told Charles that, when the Court reconvened in 
two days, he would be expected to answer the charge.294 On 
Monday, January 22, the Court reconvened, and the prosecu-
tion demanded that Charles be made to answer or, if he contin-
ued to refuse, that the charge be taken pro confesso.295 Still the 
King refused, insisting on being shown a legal basis for the 
Court’s jurisdiction,296 and the proceedings were again ad-
journed.297 
The next day, the prosecutor renewed his motion for a 
judgment pro confesso.298 Bradshaw again turned to Charles: 
You were told, over and over again, That the Court did affirm their 
own jurisdiction; that it was not for you, nor any other man, to dis-
pute the jurisdiction of the supreme and highest Authority of Eng-
land, from which there is no appeal . . . . I do require you, that you 
make a positive Answer unto this Charge . . . .299 
Charles again refused,300 and Bradshaw at last ordered a de-
fault judgment against him.301 Oddly, the commissioners then 
assembled in private to hear the witnesses on the merits who 
would have testified had the trial proceeded.302 On January 27, 
the Court reconvened in public for sentencing, and, after Brad-
shaw made a long speech laying out Charles’s crimes,303 he an-
nounced that the sentence was death by beheading.304 Charles I 
was executed on January 30, 1649.305 
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E. THE MEANING OF CHARLES FOR FRANKLIN 
Franklin was clearly of two minds about the execution of 
Charles I. On the one hand, Charles was a tyrant, as all good 
American patriots of the Founding era knew.306 As early as the 
debate over the Petition of Right, members of Parliament re-
ferred to Charles’s (and Buckingham’s) actions as tending to 
enslave the theretofore free English people.307 Even Hume uses 
the language of slavery, tyranny, and usurpation in describing 
Charles’s reliance on unconstitutional prerogative taxation.308 
The Grand Remonstrance accused Charles of subverting the 
constitution,309 and both the ordinance for trying Charles310 
and the charge against him311 amplified this accusation. No 
less than the charges against Caesar, the charges against 
Charles were of subverting the constitution and thereby of con-
verting free citizens into slavish subjects—that is, of destroying 
republican liberty. And, like Caesar, Charles had attempted to 
maintain this tyranny through a bloody civil war. There is no 
doubt that Franklin and his compatriots saw Charles this way; 
indeed, in December 1775, as the Revolutionary War was al-
ready underway, Franklin penned an anonymous “epitaph” for 
John Bradshaw, the presiding judge at Charles’s trial.312 The 
epitaph ends with the exhortation, “And never—never forget / 
THAT REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO 
GOD.”313 On the merits, Charles was a tyrant, and tyrants 
ought to be deposed. 
But, as we have seen, Charles’s “trial” was not on the mer-
its; it was, rather, a jurisdictional hearing. When Franklin 
noted that “[e]very body cried out agst [the trial] as unconstitu-
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tional,”314 he was acknowledging the simple fact that Charles 
had the better of the jurisdictional arguments. The English 
constitution demanded the assent of Commons, Lords, and 
Crown to a bill before it became law, yet the House of Commons 
dispensed with that requirement and passed the ordinance es-
tablishing the High Court of Justice on its own.315 The Com-
mons also redefined treason and applied the new definition to 
Charles, ex post facto, on its own authority.316 And, of course, 
the House of Commons that did all of these things was not the 
duly elected House of the Long Parliament, but rather the 
purged House of the Rump Parliament.317 Moreover, the ordi-
nance establishing the Court itself announced the defendant’s 
guilt,318 and the commissioners were chosen by name, specifi-
cally to sit in judgment in this one case.319 None of this was 
constitutional.320 
Indeed, the only honest answer to Charles’s demand to 
know by what legal authority he was tried would have been to 
admit that there was no legal authority, that this was a revolu-
tionary act. After all, Charles himself acknowledged that “there 
are many unlawful authorities in the world, thieves and rob-
bers by the highways,”321 and to this list he might have added 
revolutionaries. Revolutionary acts are, by definition, ultra 
vires—this does not make them substantively unjust (certainly, 
Franklin and his fellow revolutionaries were in no position to 
declare revolution unjust tout court), but it does make them 
procedurally irregular. Charles’s refusal to plead—that is, his 
refusal to pretend as if the normal legal forms applied—laid 
bare the revolutionary nature of the regicides’ act.322 
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In short, the regicides of Charles I were little different 
than the assassins of Caesar. In both cases, political actors as-
serted an alternative constitutional vision in the medium of 
blood. In both cases, support for that bloody act can only be 
based on the substantive validity of their justifications, for in 
neither case can the killers make a plausible claim to have fol-
lowed the forms of procedural justice. As we have seen, in both 
cases, Franklin and his colleagues accepted the substantive 
justice of their revolutionary forebearers’ actions.  
Moreover, in both cases, the killers’ claims of substantive 
justice are bolstered by several other factors. First, there was 
no procedurally regular way of achieving the same ends: much 
as Caesar had, through violence and intimidation, neutralized 
all legal opposition, and much as Charles had, by dissolution 
and prorogation, prevented the impeachment of Buckingham, 
so too did the existing constitutional structures make the re-
moval of the King illegal. And second, in both cases, the killers 
acted openly: just as Brutus and his compatriots marched 
through the streets in their bloody clothes proclaiming the re-
turn of liberty, so too the regicides did their deed in public, with 
an audience, and under their own names. Even Felton chose to 
act in public and carried on him a written justification, in case 
he died in the attempt. Franklin and his contemporaries, then, 
accepted not only that Caesar, Buckingham, and Charles all 
aimed at the destruction of republican liberty, but also that, 
under the circumstances, this tyranny justified the resort to ex-
tra-legal violence. 
But successful revolutionaries are rarely permanent revo-
lutionaries. Franklin and his colleagues, having won their in-
dependence, now sought to create a constitution which would 
both instantiate substantive republican justice and create pro-
cedures allowing for a nonrevolutionary response to substan-
tive injustices. An American Caesar or Charles would deserve 
to be deposed, just as the Roman and English versions did—
this is why Franklin drew a substantive link between im-
peachment and assassination. But America would have in place 
procedures for deposing obnoxious magistrates, up to and in-
cluding the chief magistrate. And American legislatures would 
not be prorogueable or dissolvable by the president, except in 
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rare cases323—indeed, the Constitution, by explicitly exempting 
impeachments from the pardon power,324 makes it clear that 
the chief magistrate may not override the impeachment 
process. Thus, the Constitution makes it very clear that the 
American chief magistrate can do wrong, and it provides meas-
ures for calling him to account.325 Charles’s jurisdictional objec-
tions would thus have no purchase in America. Moreover, an 
American Charles would not be able to protect himself or his 
favorite by dismissing Congress. An American Buckingham 
would be impeached, and no president could prevent this 
through parliamentary maneuvering. Assassinability thus pro-
vides the substantive law of presidential impeachability, while 
the Constitution’s procedural innovations domesticate the 
process, making it less violent, less disruptive, and less error-
prone. 
Subsequent events would demonstrate the wisdom of the 
Constitution’s innovations. The procedural improvements of 
impeachment over assassination can perhaps best be observed 
by looking at a historical moment in which the two occurred in 
short order: the assassination of President Lincoln and the im-
peachment of President Johnson. 
III.  LINCOLN AND BOOTH; JOHNSON AND THE RADICAL 
REPUBLICANS   
A. LINCOLN AND BOOTH 
In November 1864, shortly after the reelection of Abraham 
Lincoln and in the midst of General Sherman’s march to the 
sea, a production of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar was staged at 
the Winter Garden theater on Broadway to raise money for a 
statue of the Bard to be placed in Central Park.326 The leading 
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roles were played by three brothers, sons of one of the greatest 
tragedians of the nineteenth century.327 Edwin Booth played 
Brutus; Junius Brutus Booth, Jr., played Cassius; and John 
Wilkes Booth played Mark Antony.328 This was not the first 
time that John Wilkes Booth had played in Shakespeare’s ty-
rannicidal tragedy: he had first performed in Julius Caesar in 
1857 at the age of nineteen,329 and it was a staple of his reper-
toire thereafter.330 Booth had literally “acted over” Caesar’s 
death in a “state[] unborn and accent[] yet unknown” when 
Caesar was assassinated, and he had internalized the nobility 
of the act that Cassius boasted would lead the assassins to be 
called “[t]he men that gave their country liberty.”331 
The nobility of tyrannicide was hardly a stretch for Booth. 
As one commentator has noted, he was born into a family with 
a “reverence for libertarian heroes.”332 Indeed, one need look no 
further than the family’s names for this to become apparent. 
Booth’s father and eldest brother were both named Junius Bru-
tus Booth, an homage to the assassin of the last Tarquin mon-
arch, founder of the Roman Republic, and ancestor of Marcus 
Brutus.333 John Wilkes Booth was himself named after John 
Wilkes, a British member of Parliament and political agitator 
who, in the 1760s and 1770s, became a champion for individual 
rights in the face of a hostile Crown and parliamentary majori-
ty.334 Booth, who received a strong classical education, was in a 
good position to appreciate the resonance of these names.335 
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But if Booth inherited a family tradition which lionized re-
sistance to arbitrary rule (and a family penchant for the dra-
matic), he was also imbued with the values of the place of his 
birth: rural Maryland.336 Maryland was a slave state with sig-
nificant Confederate sympathies—Lincoln received only about 
2200 of the 90,000 or so presidential votes cast in the state in 
1860.337 On the advice of Pinkerton detectives, the D.C. militia, 
and his Secretary of State-designate—all of whom had specific 
fears about his safety—Lincoln travelled through Maryland se-
cretly in the middle of the night on the way to his inaugura-
tion.338 After Fort Sumter, when Lincoln sent out his first call 
for military volunteers, Maryland provided none; hundreds of 
Marylanders, instead, enlisted in Virginia regiments.339 And 
when Union volunteers from Massachusetts passed through 
Baltimore on their way to Washington, they were attacked by a 
mob and forced to fight their way out, killing twelve civilians in 
the process.340 In retaliation, the governor of Maryland ordered 
that several railroad bridges be burned to prevent more Union 
troops from coming through Baltimore.341 
As that last example makes clear, Maryland was not only a 
state with deeply ambivalent feelings toward the Union; it was 
 
the papers of the author of the pamphlet. Wilkes successfully sued both the 
searching officer and Lord Halifax for trespass on the grounds that the war-
rant was illegal. Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1406 (1769); 
Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153 (1763); see also AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11–14, 16–17, 21, 29 
(1997) (describing Wilkes’s impact on the development of the right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures). Both houses of Parliament later declared 
Wilkes guilty of contempt, and, although the voters continued electing Wilkes 
to his seat in the House of Commons, the Commons refused to seat him be-
tween 1768 and 1774. In 1774, however, the House bowed to overwhelming 
public pressure and seated him. See CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at 155–58 (dis-
cussing Wilkes’s conflicts with Parliament). For an account of Wilkes’s life, see 
generally ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL 
LIBERTY (2006). For a description of the American lionization of Wilkes, see 
generally Pauline Maier, John Wilkes and American Disillusionment with 
Britain, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 373 (1963). 
 335. See MICHAEL W. KAUFFMAN, AMERICAN BRUTUS: JOHN WILKES 
BOOTH AND THE LINCOLN CONSPIRACIES 86–87, 92–93, 200 (2004) (discussing 
Booth’s education and his familiarity with the names). 
 336. Id. at 81–82.  
 337. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME 7 (1998). 
 338. Id. at 6–7.  
 339. KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 116.  
 340. REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 20–21. 
 341. Id. at 21.  
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also a state of special strategic importance. With Virginia serv-
ing as capital of the Confederacy, Maryland was all that con-
nected Washington, D.C., to the rest of the Union. Secession by 
Maryland would leave the Union capital surrounded and iso-
lated. It is therefore not surprising that some of Lincoln’s war 
policies fell hardest on Maryland. In April 1861, he authorized 
General Scott to suspend habeas corpus at any point on or near 
rail lines used by the military between Philadelphia and Wash-
ington.342 Within a month, John Merryman was arrested by 
Union troops in a Baltimore suburb for participating in the de-
struction of the railroad bridges.343 Chief Justice Taney, riding 
circuit, granted Merryman’s habeas petition on the grounds 
that Lincoln had no authority to suspend the writ;344 as Taney 
himself noted, though, he was “resisted by a force too strong for 
[him] to overcome,”345 and Merryman was held by the military 
for several more months.346 Nor was Merryman the only Mary-
lander held without charges by military authorities: a number 
of Confederate-supporting Maryland legislators were arrested 
to keep them from introducing a secession resolution,347 as 
were disloyal newspaper publishers,348 and plenty of others.349 
The constitutionality of Lincoln’s various wartime meas-
ures has been extensively debated,350 and it is not my purpose 
to enter into such debates here. What is hard to dispute, how-
ever, is that, in the words of two recent commentators, “Lincoln 
. . . wielded more raw, unilateral power than any president in 
 
 342. Id. at 25 (reprinting the order to General Scott).  
 343. Id. at 26.  
 344. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144–45, 152–53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) 
(No. 9487).  
 345. Id. at 153.  
 346. REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 38–39. 
 347. Id. at 45.  
 348. Id. at 46.  
 349. See Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Lincoln Administration and Arbitrary Ar-
rests: A Reconsideration, 5 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 6, 8 (1983) (noting the 
large number of civilian arrests); id. at 13 (noting that Marylanders were dis-
proportionately among those arrested).  
 350. See generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003); 
JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 
1964); REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 3–169; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The 
David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1120–26 (defending Lincoln’s constitutional vision of the in-
dissolubility of the Union); William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1807, 1853–61 (2008) (defending Lincoln’s suspension of habeas and his disre-
gard of Taney’s Merryman opinion).  
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American history, before or since.”351 Especially to those who 
doubted the constitutionality of preserving the Union by 
force352 or of freeing the South’s slaves,353 Lincoln’s vigorous ac-
tions were bound to seem particularly objectionable. And object 
many did. 
The Southern press was, of course, vitriolic,354 and resi-
dents of the border states might well have had access to news-
papers like the Richmond Dispatch, which compared the 
Emancipation Proclamation to Caesar’s defiance of the tribune 
Mettellus355 and thundered that the rule of law was no safer in 
the North “than it had [been] in Rome when the whole republic 
was writhing in the iron grasp of the great Dictator. . . . Those 
who were once [Lincoln’s] fellow citizens, are now his timid and 
abject slaves.”356 But one need not look to the Confederate press 
to find such forceful denunciations of Lincoln; the Copperhead 
 
 351. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 173 (2008).  
 352. Louisiana Senator Judah Benjamin (later to serve in a number of cab-
inet positions in the Confederacy) told his colleagues in December of 1860 that 
“[t]hese States, parties to the compact [i.e., the Constitution], have a right to 
withdraw from it, by virtue of its own provisions, when those provisions are 
violated by the other parties to the compact, when either powers not granted 
are usurped, or rights are refused that are especially granted to the States.” 
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 2D SESS. 215 (1860). And it was not simply South-
erners who took the position that the federal government had no authority to 
prevent secession—President Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian, made the same ar-
gument in his final State of the Union message to Congress. James Buchanan, 
Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1860), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 626, 635–36 (James D. Rich-
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eral government has no power “to coerce a State into submission which is at-
tempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn” from the Union). For the 
Lincoln-esque rejoinder to Benjamin and Buchanan, see Amar, supra note 350, 
at 1120–26. 
 353. See FARBER, supra note 350, at 152–57 (discussing the constitutional 
debates attendant on the Emancipation Proclamation).  
 354. See generally Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Anti-Lincoln Tradition, 4 J. 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 6, 8–10 (1982) (noting that the image of Lincoln in 
the Southern press in the 1860s “bears a striking resemblance to the American 
image of Adolf Hitler in the 1940s”). 
 355. Editorial, The Twin Proclamations, RICHMOND DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 
1862, reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A PRESS PORTRAIT 315, 315 (Herbert 
Mitgang ed., 2000) [hereinafter PRESS PORTRAIT] (stating that Northerners 
“are learning, in its full force, the meaning of Julius Caesar’s terrible saying, 
‘inter arma silent leges’”). On Caesar and Mettellus, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 81–83. 
 356. The Twin Proclamations, supra note 355, at 315. 
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press in the North was every bit as strident.357 A New York 
newspaper asserted in 1861 that “Mr. Lincoln is evidently a be-
liever in the savageries of old Europe, and thinks that the only 
way to ‘save the Union’ is to resort to the bayonet.”358 At a 
Democratic meeting in New York in 1863, one speaker declared 
that “[s]tep by step had Abe Lincoln departed from his promises 
until by gradations of infamy he sat on a kingly throne and as-
pired to a regal crown,” to which the crowd responded, “Hang 
him.”359 Another speaker declared that “[l]oyalty to Abraham 
Lincoln was treason to the Constitution” and threatened that, 
in time, Lincoln “would see how treason in reality would be 
punished.”360 A third speaker was even more explicit, echoing 
Patrick Henry’s speech on the eve of the American Revolution: 
“Caesar had his Brutus, . . . Charles I had his Cromwell, and 
the George III. of the present day might profit by their exam-
ple.”361 By 1864, a New York paper declared that “the masses of 
the North are witnessing the transformation of their Govern-
ment to absolutism. Their liberties vanish, their rights are ig-
nored.”362 Weeks later, the same paper asked, simply, “By 
whom and when was Abraham Lincoln made dictator in this 
country?”363 
In Wisconsin, Marcus Mills Pomeroy repeatedly used his 
La Crosse Democrat to attack Lincoln as a “tyrant” and “des-
pot” who had instituted a “reign of terror” and had “warred 
against the Constitution.”364 In an 1863 editorial, Pomeroy 
 
 357. Lincoln also took heated criticism from Republicans who thought he 
was prepared to make too many concessions to the South and was too dismis-
sive of congressional power. For example, the 1864 Wade-Davis Manifesto, 
published in Horace Greeley’s New-York Daily Tribune, accused Lincoln of ex-
ercising “plenary dictatorial power” in contravention of congressional authori-
ty. B.F. Wade & H. Winter Davis, To the Supporters of the Government, N.Y. 
DAILY TRIB., Aug. 5, 1864, at 5. See generally Fehrenbacher, supra note 354, at 
12–13 (describing the Radical Republicans’ attacks on Lincoln). 
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355, at 261, 261.  
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reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 369, 371. 
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prayed for Lincoln’s death,365 and after Lincoln was reelected, 
Pomeroy wrote of his willingness to assassinate him.366 In Lin-
coln’s home state, the Chicago Times called the Emancipation 
Proclamation “a monstrous usurpation, a criminal wrong, and 
an act of national suicide.”367 The Illinois State Register re-
sponded to Lincoln’s 1864 reelection campaign by declaring 
that Lincoln’s administration had 
tricked the country into a war, which it has proved itself incapable of 
prosecuting successfully or concluding honorably. It has violated the 
rights of the people, in a manner, which, in any other country, would 
have provoked a revolution. The most powerful monarchy in Europe 
would not dare commit the outrages which have been put upon us by 
the Lincoln administration. . . . The surrender of personal rights, and 
the establishment of an erratic, irresponsible despotism, does not help 
the cause of the Union a particle . . . . The doom of Lincoln and black 
republicanism is sealed . . . [a]nd the would be despots at Washington 
must succumb to their fate.368 
The Indianapolis Daily Sentinel reprinted an editorial from the 
Times of London369 that declared that Lincoln “governed 
. . . with a revolutionary freedom from the trammels of law” 
and “carried on a war with a barbarity at which the world has 
stood amazed, destroying harbors, burning river side towns, 
putting the inhabitants of captured places to hard labor, con-
trary to all the laws of war, and even wreaking a shameless 
 
 365. Id. at 28.  
 366. Id. at 32.  
 367. Editorial, The Emancipation Proclamation, CHI. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
1862, reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 303, 304.  
 368. Editorial, The End of Lincoln, ILL. ST. REG., Aug. 7, 1864, reprinted in 
PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 406, 406–07.  
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e.g., Editorial, TIMES (London), Nov. 22, 1864, at 6 (declaring Lincoln’s reelec-
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the subversion of a popular Government, which may still exist in form, but 
which in substance is gone”); Editorial, TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 1862, at 8 
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Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister to the Court of St. James, 
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vengeance on women.”370 The editorial went on to refer to the 
Lincoln Administration as “Washington terrorists” and de-
clared that, although “[a] brilliant despotism may blind a na-
tion for a time, . . . a Government that is at once tyrannical and 
stupid cannot long avert its overthrow.”371 In Booth’s home 
state, the aptly named newspaper The South responded to Lin-
coln’s 1861 request to Congress for troops and supply by declar-
ing him to be “the equal, in despotic wickedness, of Nero or any 
of the other tyrants who have polluted this earth.”372 
By the time of Lincoln’s 1864 reelection campaign, the New 
York Times had ample evidence of 
the unexampled abuse which has been poured upon the Administra-
tion for the last two years. No living man was ever charged with polit-
ical crimes of such multiplicity and such enormity as ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN. He has been denounced without end as a perjurer, a usur-
per, a tyrant, a subverter of the Constitution, a destroyer of the liber-
ties of his country, a reckless desperado, a heartless trifler over the 
last agonies of an expiring nation. Had that which has been said of 
him been true there is no circle in DANTE’S Inferno full enough of 
torment to expiate his iniquities.373 
Although the Times went on to conclude that the charges were 
false and that “the guilt rests not with ABRAHAM LINCOLN, but 
with his railers,”374 it was the “railers” who had the ear of John 
Wilkes Booth. 
In a draft of a speech (which he never delivered) written 
shortly after Lincoln’s election, Booth made clear both his views 
on slavery—“[I]nstead of looking upon slavery as a sin[,] . . . I 
hold it to be a happiness for themselves and a social & political 
blessing for us. . . . I have been through the whole South and 
have marked the happiness of master & of man”375—and on the 
“trators [sic]” who “preach the Abolition doctrine.”376 His broth-
er Edwin reported Booth’s belief that “Lincoln would be made 
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king of America,”377 and his sister Asia reported a more ex-
tended outburst: 
[Lincoln] is made the tool of the North, to crush out, or try to crush 
out slavery, by robbery, rapine, slaughter and bought armies. . . . He 
is Bonaparte in one great move, that is, by overturning this blind Re-
public and making himself a king. This man’s re-election which will 
follow his success, I tell you, will be a reign! . . . You’ll see, you’ll see 
that re-election means succession.378 
Lincoln, like Caesar before him, wanted to be king. Republican 
liberty required a savior. And, like Brutus, Booth saw himself 
as having a hereditary obligation to stamp out tyranny. After 
all, was he not also the heir of a Junius Brutus?379 Was he not 
also named for a hero in the cause of liberty?380 Was Booth 
himself not the rightful heir of the tyrannicides and regicides 
he had studied and acted? 
Booth made a point of playing up his connections to Bru-
tus. He intended to kill Lincoln on April 13, 1865381—the Ides 
of April.382 (In one of the great symbolic ironies of American 
history, Lincoln stayed home with a headache on April 13.383 
The assassination was thus postponed to the next day—Good 
Friday—thereby linking Lincoln not with Caesar, but with 
Christ.)384 The act was consciously done in public, in front of an 
audience.385 And Booth followed his shot by leaping to the stage 
and yelling, “Sic semper tyrannis!”386—the use of Latin, if not 
the actual words, calling upon Roman republicanism.387 Booth 
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also sought to learn from Brutus’s mistake: by allowing Antony 
and Octavius to live, Brutus ultimately undercut his aim of re-
storing republican liberty. Booth would make no such mistake. 
At the same time he was assassinating Lincoln, his colleagues 
were dispatched to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson and 
Secretary of State William Seward.388 (Seward would survive 
the vicious attack,389 while the conspirator tasked with killing 
Johnson lost his nerve and spent the evening drinking in-
stead.)390 
After Booth’s dramatic leap to the stage, he ran out the 
back door of Ford’s Theater, grabbed his waiting horse, and 
took flight.391 Like Felton before him,392 Booth took steps to en-
sure that written justification of his actions would be circu-
lated. As news of the assassination spread, a friend of Booth’s 
remembered that Booth had handed him a letter the previous 
day and asked him to see that it was published in the National 
Intelligencer.393 The letter asserted that, “Many will blame me 
for what I am about to do, but posterity, I am sure, will justify 
me.”394 Booth’s sister also recalled that he had left a package 
with her; inside was a letter to Booth’s mother, in which he in-
sisted that  
[f ]or four years I have lived (I may say) a slave in the north (a favored 
slave its [sic] true, but no less hateful to me on that account.) . . . I 
cannot longer resist the inclination to go and share the sufferings of 
my brave countrymen, holding an unequal strife (for every right hu-
man & divine) against the most ruthless enemy, the world has ever 
known.395 
Also in the package was another letter, this one meant to be 
published as a justification of the assassination.396 Here, he as-
serted that “[t]he very nomination of Abraham Lincoln [in 
1860], spoke plainly, war—war upon Southern rights and insti-
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tutions.”397 He went on to describe slavery as “one of the great-
est blessings (both for themselves and us) that God ever be-
stowed upon a favored nation”398 and abolitionists as “the only 
traitors in the land.”399 
Booth continued to write apologia even as he was on the 
run. In a journal entry, he lamented his hunted status: 
And why; For doing what Brutus was honored for, what made Tell a 
Hero. And yet I for striking down a greater tyrant than they ever 
knew am looked upon as a common cutthroat. My action was purer 
than either of theirs. . . . A country groaned beneath this tyranny and 
prayed for this end. Yet now behold the cold hand they extend to 
me.400 
Booth, in his own mind, was just like Brutus—only better, for 
he struck down a greater tyrant, and with purer motives. Booth 
was certain that Lincoln sought to become king; he was certain 
that Lincoln had no right to go to war and no right to free the 
South’s slaves; and he was certain that Lincoln had no right to 
suspend habeas corpus, arrest Southern partisans, and try 
them before military commissions. Like the opponents of Cae-
sar and Charles before him, Booth believed that Lincoln’s inno-
vations in government had reduced himself and his compatriots 
to the status of bondsmen.401 In short, to Booth it was pellucid-
ly clear that Lincoln had subverted the Constitution, exercised 
tyrannical power unconstrained by law, and prosecuted a 
bloody civil war in which more than 600,000 soldiers per-
ished.402 And Booth was not alone in these views—as we have 
seen, editorial writers and orators from New York to Illinois to 
Indiana, not to mention those of the Confederacy, shared these 
views. But were these not the very crimes for which Caesar and 
Charles died? Booth, who had played Antony the previous year 
at the Winter Garden, was certain that this time he had “acted 
over” Brutus’s “lofty scene”—and he was hurt that his coun-
trymen were not lining up to celebrate him as “[t]he m[a]n that 
gave [his] country liberty.”403 
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Booth was, in fact, using the correct standard. A chief mag-
istrate who subverted the Constitution, aggrandized his own 
power, reduced his fellow citizens to the status of slaves, and 
prosecuted a devastating and unnecessary civil war was a ty-
rant and deserved to be removed from power. This was the les-
son that not only Booth, but the American Founding generation 
as well, took from Caesar and Charles. To Franklin and his col-
leagues, not only was this the correct standard for the removal 
of a chief magistrate, but it was also the case that the Roman 
tyrannicides and the English regicides had properly applied 
this standard—Caesar and Charles were, on the merits, ty-
rants. Still, Franklin and his compatriots knew well the fallibil-
ity of human judgment and decided therefore to append a pro-
cedural mechanism—impeachment—to this substantive 
standard. It was this procedural mechanism that John Wilkes 
Booth, in his epistemic hubris, circumvented. 
And Booth, of course, was substantively mistaken.404 
Whatever one’s judgment on the constitutional merits of any 
particular action of Lincoln’s, he was no tyrant—if nothing else, 
his insistence on submitting his actions to Congress405 and on 
 
 404. To call this a “mistake” may be to give Booth too much credit. Unlike 
Brutus or the regicides, Booth did not present his actions to the polity for their 
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 405. Within days of the Battle of Fort Sumter, Lincoln summoned a special 
session of Congress to meet on July 4, 1861. See Abraham Lincoln, A Procla-
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holding the 1864 election demonstrates that.406 Booth’s sub-
stantive mistake highlights the wisdom of the Constitution’s 
proceduralized alternative to assassination. Booth and his 
Copperhead fellow travelers not only had the opportunity to de-
feat Lincoln at the ballot box, they also had the opportunity to 
impeach him. If Lincoln truly was a tyrant bent on waging a 
cruel war in order to solidify his power and enslave the nation, 
then why not present these facts to Congress, a forum in which 
Lincoln would have the “opportunity of vindicating his charac-
ter”?407 If Booth and his compatriots could convince the House 
and Senate that they were right, then Lincoln would be re-
moved and the specter of tyranny would have passed. Unlike 
Caesar, Lincoln had not disbanded the institutions meant to 
check him; unlike Charles, he had no power to dismiss the leg-
islature and thereby foil its intentions. Of course, the simple 
answer is that Congress had no intention of impeaching and 
removing President Lincoln—that is to say, Congress did not 
believe that the Copperhead charge of tyranny was correct. In-
deed, we can go further: the conduct of the war was the issue in 
the 1862 and 1864 congressional elections. The fact that the 
Copperheads did not control more seats in Congress was there-
fore evidence that the American people—those remaining in 
the Union, at least—did not regard Lincoln as a tyrant. In this 
judgment, the American people, and their representatives in 
Congress, were correct.408 
 
As one historian has summarized,  
Lincoln was asking Congress to validate what he had done; he did not 
claim authority to act arbitrarily in cases where the Constitution 
spoke delphically. His request for congressional endorsement offered 
to share authority, to involve both branches of government in meeting 
the crisis. Lincoln wanted a constitutional process in dialogue, not in 
conflict. 
PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 80–81 (1994). 
This eagerness to engage in constitutional dialogue is the antithesis of tyranny. 
 406. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 146 
(2005) (“[I]n the middle of a great civil war, Lincoln presided over a fair elec-
tion on schedule in 1864, even though for much of the campaign he had ex-
pected to lose this contest, and its result threatened to unravel everything that 
he had done in office.”). 
 407. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.  
 408. It should not be entirely surprising that the deliberate judgment of a 
large group is superior to the judgment of a lone individual. Cf. Josh Chafetz, 
Book Note, It’s the Aggregation, Stupid!, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 577 (2005) 
(reviewing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004), and discuss-
ing the literature on crowd wisdom). 
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The combination of Booth’s mistake in judgment and his 
lack of epistemic humility led to the political tragedy and per-
sonal injustice that was America’s first presidential assassina-
tion. The controversy surrounding Lincoln’s successor in office 
would further point to the wisdom of a procedural mechanism 
for executive removal. 
B. JOHNSON AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 
Although Lincoln has been widely applauded for putting 
together a cabinet consisting of a “Team of Rivals” to shepherd 
the nation through the Civil War,409 it was his choice in 1864 of 
a War Democrat, Andrew Johnson, as his vice president that 
was to lead to the next crisis over executive removal.410 In the 
midst of a grave national crisis, Johnson came into the presi-
dency with no independent electoral mandate and with both 
houses of Congress controlled by the Republicans. This was a 
tricky situation, to say the least, and tact was never one of 
Johnson’s strong suits.411 And so it was that less than three 
years after the Lincoln assassination, Booth’s surviving co-
conspirators were asked if they had any incriminating evidence 
against Johnson that would aid the House of Representatives 
in its drive to impeach him.412 They had no evidence to give—
Johnson had nothing to do with the assassination413—but it is 
indicative of how much Radical Republicans in Congress de-
spised Johnson that they sought to make common cause with 
the assassins of Lincoln against him. 
What had Johnson done to cause this animus? There is no 
doubt that, from early in his presidency, he was at loggerheads 
with Congress over fundamental questions about Reconstruc-
tion. As early as the summer of 1865, congressional Republi-
cans were unhappy that Johnson was not more aggressive in 
 
 409. See generally DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE 
POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005). 
 410. Although there is some debate as to how involved Lincoln was in the 
choice of his running mate in 1864, at a minimum it is clear that he was not 
opposed to Johnson. See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON: A 
BIOGRAPHY 177–79 (1989). 
 411. See id. at 54 (“A pronounced streak of stubbornness was characteristic 
of Johnson in politics as well as in personal relations.”). 
 412. Four of Booth’s co-conspirators were sentenced to prison terms in the 
Dry Tortugas, a remote island chain at the end of the Florida Keys. See 
KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 376. In 1867, they were contacted there and 
asked if they had any incriminating evidence on Johnson. See id. at 380. 
 413. Id.  
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confiscating the land of former Confederates.414 Early the next 
year, Johnson vetoed both the Freedman’s Bureau Bill and the 
Civil Rights Act;415 the latter veto was subsequently overridden 
by Congress.416 In the message accompanying his veto of the 
Freedman’s Bureau Bill, Johnson did not limit himself to dis-
puting the Bill’s wisdom and constitutionality;417 he went on to 
suggest that no legislation affecting the South should pass until 
the Southern states were readmitted to Congress.418 The Re-
publican response to Johnson’s vetoes was furious. The Roch-
ester, New York, Democrat editorialized that Johnson’s “objec-
tions are captious and pettifogging, and exhibit no sincere 
desire to coöperate in the work which Congress has underta-
ken. He assumes the attitude and repeats the arguments of the 
Democratic leaders.”419 The Delaware State Journal somberly 
noted that “[s]ince the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, no 
public event has more deeply saddened the hearts and called 
forth the condemnation of the Union men of the State of Dela-
ware” than Johnson’s vetoes.420 The Washington Chronicle de-
clared that the Freedman’s Bureau Bill veto message “will fall 
like the cold hand of death upon the warm impulses of the 
American people.”421 And the Chicago Tribune called upon “the 
masses of the loyal people [to] rise against this veto of a meas-
ure intended as a bulwark against Slavery and treason, as they 
rose in their might when the flag of the Union was first hauled 
down from Fort Sumter.”422 Members of Congress, too, reacted 
harshly to the vetoes.423  
 
 414. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC 
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW 
JOHNSON 203 (1992).  
 415. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 287–
90, 314–15 (1960). 
 416. Id. at 323–24. 
 417. Although he certainly did question them. See Andrew Johnson, Veto 
Message (Feb. 19, 1866), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 398, 
398–403. 
 418. See id. at 403–05.  
 419. Quoted in The Republican Press on the Veto Message, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 3, 
1866, at 9. 
 420. Quoted in id.  
 421. Quoted in id. 
 422. Quoted in id. 
 423. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 931–32 (1866) (state-
ment of Sen. Benjamin Wade on the veto of the Freedman’s Bureau Bill); id. at 
936–43 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull on same); id. at 1832–37 (state-
ment of Rep. William Lawrence on the Civil Rights Bill). 
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Johnson, characteristically, responded to the criticism by 
lashing out. In an hour-long speech outside the White House to 
a cheering Democratic crowd, he equated the Radical Republi-
cans in Congress with the Southern secessionists: 
I look upon them . . . as being as much opposed to the fundamental 
principles of this government, and believe they are as much laboring 
to prevent or destroy them as were the men who fought against us. (A 
Voice—“What are the names?”) I say Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsyl-
vania—(tremendous applause)—I say Charles Sumner—(great ap-
plause). I say Wendell Phillips and others of the same stripe are 
among them.424 
With such heated rhetoric on both sides, it was almost inevita-
ble that the clash would continue to escalate. 
Emboldened by the 1866 election in which the Republicans 
achieved veto-proof majorities in both houses of Congress,425 
Radical Republicans first moved in January 1867 to impeach 
Johnson. Congressman James Ashley of Ohio offered a resolu-
tion authorizing the Judiciary Committee to inquire into John-
son’s conduct, and specifically whether he “has been guilty of 
acts which are designed or calculated to overthrow, subvert, or 
corrupt the Government of the United States, or any depart-
ment or office thereof,” which would justify impeachment.426 
The Judiciary Committee took testimony throughout the month 
of February, but was unable to bring its investigation to a con-
clusion by the time the Thirty-Ninth Congress expired on 
March 4.427 
Meanwhile, the lame duck Congress passed three signifi-
cant pieces of legislation. On February 18, Congress passed the 
Tenure of Office Act, which substantially limited the presi-
dent’s power to remove executive branch officers. The Act pro-
vided that most Senate-confirmed officers were entitled to re-
main in office until a replacement was confirmed by the 
Senate.428 Certain important officers, however—including the 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War—were entitled to re-
main in office “during the term of the President by whom they 
may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject 
to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
 
 424. The Veto, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 23, 1866, at 1.  
 425. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 208. 
 426. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2D SESS. 320 (1867).  
 427. See REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 211. 
 428. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (repealed 
1887).  
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ate.”429 During a Senate recess, an officer who was “guilty of 
misconduct in office, or crime, or for any reason shall become 
incapable or legally disqualified to perform its duties” could be 
suspended by the president.430 Once the Senate reconvened, it 
would have to ratify this suspension and appoint a replace-
ment; if it refused to ratify the suspension, then the suspended 
officer must be immediately reinstated.431 Violations of the Act 
were made a criminal offense.432 
Two days after sending the Tenure of Office Act to the 
president, both houses passed the Reconstruction Act. This Act 
divided the states of the former Confederacy into five “military 
districts,” each to be commanded by an army officer of the rank 
of brigadier-general or above.433 Existing state governments 
were deemed to be “provisional only,” with the commanding 
general having the authority to “abolish, modify, control, or su-
persede” them when he saw fit.434 The Act also specified the 
conditions, including ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, on which the rebellious states would be allowed to return 
to Congress.435 
Finally, on March 2, Congress passed the Army Appropria-
tions Act, which contained two provisions that went beyond ap-
propriations. First, it required that the headquarters of the 
General of the Army be located in Washington—where Con-
gress could keep an eye on it—and that all orders from the 
president to the military be issued via the General of the Army, 
who could not be dismissed without the consent of the Sen-
ate.436 This was meant to transfer power from Johnson to Gen-
eral Grant, who was much preferred by the Republicans in 
Congress. Second, the Act disbanded the militias of a number of 
former Confederate states.437 
On March 2, President Johnson vetoed the Tenure of Office 
Act on the unanimous advice of his Cabinet;438 vetoed the Re-
 
 429. Id.  
 430. Id. § 2.  
 431. Id.  
 432. Id. §§ 5–6, 9.  
 433. Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867).  
 434. Id. § 6.  
 435. Id. § 5.  
 436. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867).  
 437. Id. § 6.  
 438. DAVID MILLER DEWITT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT 
ANDREW JOHNSON, SEVENTEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 202–03 
(1967).  
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construction Act, which only his Secretary of War, Edwin Stan-
ton, urged him to sign;439 and signed the Army Appropriations 
Act, while protesting that it both “virtually deprives the Presi-
dent of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief” 
and “denies to ten States of this Union their constitutional 
right to protect themselves in any emergency by means of their 
own militia.”440 Both of Johnson’s vetoes were overridden that 
same day.441 
The Fortieth Congress was even more combative, quickly 
passing two Supplementary Reconstruction Acts over Johnson’s 
veto.442 It was clear by this point that the Republican-
dominated Congress and the Democratic president were irre-
mediably at loggerheads, and the pattern of their interaction 
was relatively fixed. Congress would pass laws providing for 
relatively strict Reconstruction measures; President Johnson 
would veto them; and Congress would then re-pass the laws 
over his veto. Meanwhile, Johnson would use his executive dis-
cretion in an attempt to pursue a more lenient Reconstruction, 
aimed at fully readmitting the rebellious states as quickly as 
possible. 
On August 5, 1867, Johnson informed Stanton—the Cabi-
net member most in line with the congressional vision of Re-
construction—that “[p]ublic considerations of a high character 
constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War 
will be accepted.”443 Stanton immediately wrote back that “pub-
lic considerations of a high character . . . constrain me not to 
resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of 
Congress.”444 One week later, Johnson informed Stanton that, 
“[b]y virtue of the power and authority vested in me as Presi-
dent by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are 
 
 439. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 209.  
 440. Andrew Johnson, Special Message to the House of Representatives 
(Mar. 2, 1867), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 472, 472. 
 441. See Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 432 (1867) (reprinting 
both the House’s and the Senate’s resolutions overriding the veto); Reconstruc-
tion Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429–30 (1867) (same). 
 442. Supplementary Reconstruction Act, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); Sup-
plementary Reconstruction Act, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867). 
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hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War.”445 Johnson 
appointed Grant as Secretary of War ad interim.446 Because 
Congress was in recess at the time, this was arguably consis-
tent with the terms of the Tenure of Office Act, so long as John-
son sought the Senate’s approval when it reconvened.447 Never-
theless, the Chicago Tribune thundered that  
[t]he country has endured Andrew Johnson as long as endurance can 
be counted a virtue. . . . [H]e should be impeached, and ejected from 
office, and rendered incapable of holding office hereafter, [and] we 
hope that Congress will resolutely take hold of the work at the coming 
session, and put him out.448 
A Boston newspaper declared that Johnson’s aim was “to throw 
the work of reconstruction into the hands of his own friends 
and sympathizers at the South and thus to defeat the purpose 
of the reconstruction acts in the very process of execution.”449 
The paper ominously noted that Johnson “is an obstacle, and he 
is in danger of suffering the fate of all obstacles in the way of 
the advancement of a nation.”450 
Before Congress could reconvene and vent its spleen, how-
ever, Republicans were dealt a setback. In the twenty states 
holding elections for state offices in November 1867, Republi-
cans “lost significant ground” in eighteen.451 It was a decidedly 
dispirited Republican majority that returned to Congress the 
next month.452 Nevertheless, the Radicals determined to push 
ahead with the impeachment inquiry that the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress had begun.453 In late November, the House Judiciary 
Committee reported by a one-vote margin in favor of impeach-
ing the president.454 The Committee’s majority report was “in-
judicious in language, even violent in spirit. Conservatives 
pointed to it as evidence that the impeachers were motivated 
more out of hatred for Andrew Johnson than concern for the 
country’s well-being.”455 In contrast, the report filed by the two 
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Republicans who voted against impeachment “assumed an air 
of moderation.”456 The combination of the electoral repudiation 
of the Radicals’ program with the extreme tone of the Radicals’ 
impeachment report led to a decisive defeat for the impeach-
ment attempt on the House floor on December 7. The Radicals 
were unable to muster even a majority of Republican votes, and 
the final tally was 57 in favor of impeachment to 108 op-
posed.457 An editorial in the New York Independent expressed 
the Radical reaction: 
If the great culprit had robbed a till; if he had fired a barn; if he had 
forged a check; he would have been indicted, prosecuted, condemned, 
sentenced, and punished. But, as the evidence shows that he only op-
pressed the negro; that he only conspired with the rebel; that he only 
betrayed the Union party; that he only attempted to overthrow the 
Republic—of course, he goes unwhipped of justice.458 
The editorial went on to lament that “[s]upreme guilt, like in-
nocence itself, is beyond the law’s ax.”459 
On January 13, 1868, the Senate refused to concur in 
Johnson’s removal of Stanton.460 By the terms of the Tenure of 
Office Act, Stanton was immediately reinstated as Secretary of 
War.461 Instead, on February 21, Johnson sent Stanton another 
note, informing him that he was “hereby removed from office as 
Secretary for the Department of War.”462 Johnson appointed 
General Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim.463 
Congress erupted. By the end of the next day, the Committee 
on Reconstruction reported an impeachment resolution to the 
House of Representatives.464 The only offenses mentioned in 
the resolution were the removal of Stanton and the appoint-
ment of Thomas.465 Unlike the previous impeachment attempt, 
this time the Republican Party was united in support of im-
peachment.466 Three days after Johnson removed Stanton from 
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office, the House voted 126 to 47 in favor of impeachment.467 On 
March 4, the House presented eleven articles of impeachment 
to the Senate.468 The first eight articles all, in varying lan-
guage, dealt with the firing of Stanton and his replacement by 
Thomas.469 The ninth article charged that Johnson told General 
Emory that he believed that the provision of the Army Appro-
priations Act requiring all orders from the president to the mil-
itary to be issued via the General of the Army was unconstitu-
tional and that Johnson’s intent in doing so was “to induce said 
Emory . . . to violate the provisions of said act, and to take and 
receive, act upon, and obey such orders as [Johnson] might 
make and give.”470 The tenth article alleged that Johnson, in 
various “intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous ha-
rangues” attempted “to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, 
contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States.”471 
The eleventh and final article charged Johnson with disparag-
ing Congress’s legitimacy because it refused to seat representa-
tives of the Southern states, “thereby denying, and intending to 
deny, that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obliga-
tory upon him,” as evinced by his failure to obey the Tenure of 
Office Act and by his attempt to thwart the Reconstruction Act 
and provisions of the Army Appropriations Act.472 
In his opening argument to the Senate, Representative 
Benjamin Franklin Butler of Massachusetts, one of the House 
impeachment managers, thundered: 
By murder most foul he succeeded to the Presidency, and is the elect 
of an assassin to that high office, and not of the people. . . . [O]ur 
frame of government gives us a remedy for such a misfortune . . . . We 
can remove him—as we are about to do—from the office he has dis-
graced by the sure, safe, and constitutional method of impeach-
ment . . . .473 
Representative John Logan of Illinois, another impeachment 
manager, also drew upon Lincoln’s legacy to Johnson’s detri-
ment:  
[T]he heathen philosophers . . . defined a good prince as “one who en-
deavors to render his subjects happy;” “and a tyrant,” on the contrary, 
“one who only aims at his own private advantage.” An example of the 
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first we had in the lamented Lincoln, and of the latter in Mr. John-
son.474 
His audience could have been expected to know how the “hea-
thens” dealt with tyrants. 
The Senate trial dragged on for several months before the 
issue came to a vote on May 16, 1868. Republican Senator 
George Williams of Oregon moved that the eleventh article be 
voted upon first, presumably because it encompassed many of 
the charges contained in the others and therefore “was thought 
to be the one that would command the most support for convic-
tion.”475 When the tally was in, thirty-five Senators voted 
guilty, nineteen voted not guilty. As this was one guilty vote 
shy of the necessary two-thirds supermajority, Johnson was ac-
quitted on this article.476 Williams, obviously flustered, moved 
that the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, adjourn for 
ten days,477 and this motion passed.478 When the impeachment 
court reconvened on May 26, Johnson was acquitted on the 
second and third articles, both on identical thirty-five to nine-
teen votes.479 Upon Williams’s motion, the impeachment court 
then adjourned sine die.480 The impeachment court never re-
convened, never entered judgment on the remaining eight ar-
ticles, and never removed Andrew Johnson from office. 
Seven Republicans voted to acquit,481 and John F. Kennedy 
famously celebrated their courage for doing so.482 In explaining 
their votes, these senators argued that Johnson had not vi-
olated the Tenure of Office Act,483 but perhaps more important 
was a principle expressed by Senator Fessenden of Maine: 
The office of President is one of the great co-ordinate branches of the 
government, having its defined powers, privileges, and duties; as es-
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sential to the very framework of the government as any other. . . . It is 
evident, then, as it seems to me, that the offence for which a Chief 
Magistrate is removed from office, and the power intrusted to him by 
the people transferred to other hands . . . should be of such a charac-
ter as to commend itself at once to the minds of all right thinking men 
as, beyond all question, an adequate cause. It should be free from the 
taint of party; leave no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the mo-
tives of those who inflict the penalty, and address itself to the country 
and the civilized world as a measure justly called for by the gravity of 
the crime, and the necessity for its punishment.484 
In contrast, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, one of the most 
influential of the Radicals, declared the impeachment fight “one 
of the last great battles with slavery,”485 and insisted that  
Andrew Johnson is the impersonation of the tyrannical slave power. 
In him it lives again. He is the lineal successor of John C. Calhoun 
and Jefferson Davis . . . . Not to dislodge [Johnson and his supporters] 
is to leave the country a prey to one of the most hateful tyrannies of 
history.486 
Sumner’s colleague Jacob Howard of Michigan declared that 
“[m]en and women all over the land hung their heads in shame, 
and the wise and reflecting saw in [Johnson] a coarse, design-
ing, and dangerous tyrant.”487 
Sumner and many of his colleagues—like Booth and his 
confederates—saw their political opponents as tyrants and 
therefore saw removing those opponents from the presidency as 
a morally justified act. Indeed, as we have seen, Republican 
newspapers compared Johnson’s vetoes of Reconstruction legis-
lation to the assassination of Lincoln,488 insisted that he aimed 
at overthrowing the Republic,489 and warned darkly that he 
was an obstacle to the advancement of a nation.490 And both 
the House impeachment managers491 and some of the Senate 
Radicals who voted for conviction492 used the language of ty-
ranny to describe Johnson’s actions in office. That is, many of 
the Radical Republicans saw Johnson in the same terms in 
which Brutus saw Caesar, in which Felton saw Buckingham, in 
which the regicides saw Charles, and in which Booth saw Lin-
coln. 
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But like Booth, the Radicals were mistaken. The first eight 
articles of impeachment dealt with Johnson’s alleged violations 
of the Tenure of Office Act by firing Stanton and appointing 
Thomas, and the ninth article dealt with Johnson’s assertions 
that the Army Appropriations Act was unconstitutional insofar 
as it required Johnson to issue all military orders via the Gen-
eral of the Army, who could only be removed with Senate con-
sent. But these two provisions were almost certainly unconsti-
tutional attempts by Congress to interfere in the internal 
workings of the executive branch.493 The president has no obli-
gation to obey an unconstitutional law494—indeed, his oath 
would seem to suggest an obligation to defy such a law495—and 
therefore violating such a law cannot be an impeachable of-
fense. The tenth article merely accused the president of saying 
unpleasant things about Congress. But surely—whether we 
want to see this through the lens of the First Amendment or 
that of separation of powers—this cannot be an impeachable of-
fense. And the eleventh article was “a potpourri which 
. . . lump[ed] together several of the charges contained in the 
earlier separate articles.”496 If those earlier articles did not 
state an impeachable offense, then neither could the eleventh. 
And even if Johnson were wrong about any of these constitu-
tional points, his arguments would still seem to be well within 
the bounds of good faith, reasonable disagreement. As Senator 
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272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). The Court’s reasoning extends to the relevant provi-
sions of the Army Appropriations Act, as well, and the Court said as much. See 
id. at 165–66. Subsequent literature has largely concurred. See, e.g., BERGER, 
supra note 4, at 292–98; David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 383, 414–19 (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in 
Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1815–45 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the 
President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 295 (1998); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, 
The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 
149–54 (2010) (arguing that one piece of evidence relied upon by supporters of 
the Tenure of Office Act does not actually address the removal power at all). 
 494. See Baude, supra note 350, at 1810 & n.13 (noting “the increasingly 
conventional wisdom that the President can or must disregard some or all 
laws that he independently believes to be unconstitutional,” and citing expres-
sions of this conventional wisdom).  
 495. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to swear or 
affirm to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”).  
 496. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 227.  
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Fessenden suggested, it is hard to characterize a good faith 
disagreement as a high crime or misdemeanor.497 
Of course, the debates over the Tenure of Office Act, the 
Army Appropriations Act, and the president’s intemperate lan-
guage were not the real sore spots between the president and 
his congressional critics. The allegations in the impeachment 
articles were merely the epiphenomenal manifestations of the 
deeper dispute over the proper course of Reconstruction and the 
aftermath of the Civil War. As Representative James Blaine, 
who voted for impeachment, put it years later in his autobio-
graphy: 
The sober reflection of later years has persuaded many who favored 
Impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges made, and 
that its success would have resulted in greater injury to free institu-
tions than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict. 
No impartial reader can examine the record of the pleadings and ar-
guments of the Managers who appeared on behalf of the House, with-
out feeling that the President was impeached for one set of misde-
meanors, and tried for another series.498 
In short, it was Johnson’s and the Radical Republicans’ “deep 
commitment to opposing, honestly held views which set them 
on a collision course.”499 But if policy disagreements—even deep 
disagreements over crucially important issues—were to be 
grounds for impeachment, then the United States would have 
moved a long way towards a parliamentary, rather than a pres-
idential, system.500 The president is not meant to be a “mere 
creature of the Legislature,” as George Mason insisted at the 
Philadelphia Convention.501 Indeed, as we have seen, it was 
precisely such a concern that led the Convention to reject “mal-
administration” as a category of impeachable offenses.502 In 
short, in David Currie’s words: “[N]o one should be impeached 
because he disagrees with the congressional will.”503 
 
 497. See supra text accompanying note 484.  
 498. 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO 
GARFIELD 376 (Norwich, Conn., Henry Bill 1886). 
 499. BERGER, supra note 4, at 264.  
 500. Even those commentators who would prefer a more parliamentary 
style of governance do not think that the Constitution actually creates such a 
system. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
114–21 (2006) (lamenting the fact that the Constitution does not allow for the 
removal of “merely” incompetent presidents).  
 501. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 86.  
 502. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10. 
 503. Currie, supra note 493, at 452.  
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But if Sumner and his colleagues were like Booth in that 
they made a substantive mistake, they were decidedly unlike 
him in their avoidance of epistemic hubris. Booth’s mistake led 
to tragedy because he acted on it in an irreversible way. The 
Radical Republicans’ mistake had no such dire consequences, 
for they allowed the Constitution’s proceduralized alternative 
to assassination to run its course. And their epistemically 
humble appeal to procedure allowed for the triumph of sub-
stantive justice, despite their mistake. Johnson may not have 
been a very good president, but neither had he committed an 
assassinable offense. Under the American constitutional 
scheme, he did not deserve to be removed—and the impeach-
ment procedures laid out in that scheme, by demanding a su-
permajority for conviction and by impressing on Senators the 
grave nature of their task, enabled the Senate to get the John-
son impeachment trial substantively right. 
As we shall see in the next Part, the same procedures also 
allowed the Senate to reach the right outcome in the only other 
presidential impeachment trial in American history. 
IV.  BILL CLINTON AND ANN COULTER   
In 1998, the conservative provocateur Ann Coulter made 
waves when she wrote that, once it was established that Presi-
dent Clinton did, in fact, lie under oath, the only debate should 
be “about whether to impeach or assassinate.”504 After express-
ing outrage in 2006 over a faux documentary portraying the fic-
tional assassination of then-President George W. Bush, Coulter 
was asked on a television news show to reconcile her outrage 
with her earlier statement about Clinton. She explained her 
earlier statement thus: 
[I]n my [1998] book, High Crimes and Misdemeanors [sic], [I was] de-
scribing the entire history of impeachment, which we got from the 
British. I explained how we changed it here in America. In Britain, it 
was a criminal punishment. You would be—one of the punishments 
was hanging. Here it was purely losing your office. At the end of this, 
I said . . . . I said the only question, if we were a decent country or 
something to that effect, would be whether to impeach or assassinate, 
not whether to impeach or not . . . .505 
 
 504. ANN H. COULTER, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE CASE 
AGAINST BILL CLINTON 107 (1998).  
 505. Hannity and Colmes: Interview with Ann Coulter, Doug Schoen (Fox 
News television broadcast Aug. 31, 2006), transcript available at 2006 WLNR 
15140850. 
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Coulter was not entirely wrong. There is, as we have seen, an 
intimate relationship between impeachment and assassination. 
Coulter seems to take this to mean that any offense she consid-
ers impeachable in the present day would have been assassina-
ble in a former time. But this gets the causality backwards. Ra-
ther, if we are to take the link between impeachment and 
assassination seriously, we should use assassinability as a 
benchmark for impeachability. On this view, it is precisely the 
fact that it was unimaginable to justify Clinton’s assassination, 
given his conduct, that made it unsuitable for impeachment. 
The facts, in brief, are these:506 In November 1995, Presi-
dent Clinton began a sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky, then 
a White House intern.507 The relationship continued through 
May 1997.508 During the course of the relationship, Lewinsky 
confided in her friend Linda Tripp, who, in mid-1997, began 
keeping detailed notes and tape recordings of her phone con-
versations with Lewinsky.509 Tripp disclosed the affair to attor-
neys for Paula Jones, who was suing Clinton for sexual har-
assment; on December 5, 1997, Lewinsky’s name was added to 
Jones’s witness list.510 On December 17, Clinton informed Lew-
insky that she was on the witness list; the president suggested 
that she offer to sign an affidavit in lieu of a deposition.511 He 
also reviewed with her their “cover story”—that Lewinsky’s 
West Wing visits were to the president’s secretary, Betty Cur-
rie, not to the president.512 On December 19, Jones’s lawyers 
subpoenaed Lewinsky to appear for a deposition in late-
January; the subpoena also directed her to produce any gifts 
that Clinton had given her.513 Lewinsky informed the president 
of the subpoena and suggested that she arrange to have Currie 
hold on to the gifts that Clinton had given her.514 Later that 
 
 506. For the purposes of this section, I rely on the facts as laid out by Inde-
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, REFERRAL 
FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998) [hereinafter 
STARR REPORT]. As Judge Posner has noted, President Clinton’s attorneys 
“made relatively little effort to rebut the strictly factual allegations” made by 
Starr. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 16 n.1 (1999). 
 507. STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 27–28. 
 508. Id. at 62.  
 509. Id. at 13; POSNER, supra note 506, at 22–24. 
 510. STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 88.  
 511. Id. at 94.  
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day, Currie picked up a box containing the gifts that Clinton 
had given Lewinsky.515 
On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky signed an affidavit stating 
that she had never had a sexual relationship with the presi-
dent.516 On January 17, President Clinton was deposed by 
Jones’s lawyers. Much of the questioning involved Lewinsky, 
and Clinton claimed that he was unable to remember many of 
the details of his interactions with her. He “emphatically de-
nied” having a sexual relationship with her.517 The next day, he 
spoke with Currie and asked her a number of leading ques-
tions, including, “You were always there when [Lewinsky] was 
there, right?” and, “Monica came on to me, and I never touched 
her, right?”518 
Unbeknownst to Clinton, Tripp had earlier in January 
turned over her notes and tapes to Kenneth Starr, the indepen-
dent counsel investigating allegations that the Clintons had 
committed crimes in conjunction with their investment in the 
Whitewater real estate development in the early 1980s.519 The 
day before Jones’s lawyers deposed Clinton, Starr obtained au-
thorization to expand his investigation to cover possible ob-
struction of justice in the Jones case.520 In late-July, shortly af-
ter Clinton’s motion for summary judgment in the Jones case 
was granted,521 Lewinsky signed an immunity agreement with 
the Independent Counsel’s Office and began cooperating with 
its investigation, including making statements and turning 
over physical evidence.522 The next month, Clinton testified be-
fore the grand jury convened by the Independent Counsel. He 
acknowledged having an affair with Lewinsky but claimed that 
he had not lied in his deposition in the Jones case because the 
acts he admitted to were not, in his view, covered by the defini-
tion of “sexual relations” he was given.523 He denied having en-
couraged Lewinsky to lie in the Jones case; he denied having 
sent Currie to retrieve the gifts he had given Lewinsky; and he 
denied having tried to convince Currie to lie for him.524 
 
 515. Id. at 102.  
 516. Id. at 107–10.  
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 520. Id. at 25–26.  
 521. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998). 
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In September 1998, Starr reported to the House of Repre-
sentatives that he found “substantial and credible information 
supporting . . . eleven possible grounds for impeachment.”525 
The first ten grounds involved lying under oath, obstructing 
justice, and witness tampering in the Jones case and before the 
Independent Counsel’s grand jury.526 The final ground alleged 
that Clinton had abused his constitutional power by lying to 
the public, the grand jury, and Congress; by promising to coop-
erate with the grand jury investigation and then breaking that 
promise; and by invoking executive privilege.527 On October 8, 
1998, the House authorized the Judiciary Committee to begin 
an impeachment inquiry.528 The Committee put eighty-one 
questions to Clinton, which he answered in writing, under 
oath.529 The Committee majority determined that his answers 
to those questions “follow[ed] the pattern of selective memory, 
reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, artful distor-
tions, outright lies and half truths he had already used.”530 
In December 1998, the Judiciary Committee reported out 
four articles of impeachment.531 The first accused Clinton of 
perjury before the Independent Counsel’s grand jury, and the 
second accused him of perjury in the Jones civil case.532 The 
third accused him of obstructing justice by suborning perjury 
and tampering with witnesses in both the Jones case and the 
Independent Counsel investigation.533 And the fourth article al-
leged that Clinton abused his power by perjuring himself in his 
answers to the Judiciary Committee’s questions.534 Less than 
two weeks later, the House of Representatives approved the 
first and third articles (alleging perjury before the grand jury 
and obstruction of justice), but rejected the other two.535 On 
 
 525. STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 129.  
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 527. Id. at 204–10.  
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February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted Clinton on both ar-
ticles, with forty-five members voting guilty on the article alleg-
ing perjury before the grand jury and fifty members voting 
guilty on the article alleging obstruction of justice,536 both well 
shy of the sixty-seven votes necessary for conviction. 
After reviewing the evidence compiled by the Independent 
Counsel, Judge Posner concluded that it was “clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that Clinton had committed federal crimes 
that would normally yield a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven 
months.537 But, of course, whether Clinton committed a crimi-
nal offense is wholly different from whether he committed an 
impeachable offense. Obviously, Coulter538—and indeed, many 
others—thought he did, and their reasons are telling. House 
Republican Whip Tom Delay, for example, declared that the 
impeachment proceedings presented 
a debate about relativism versus absolute truth. The President’s de-
fenders have said that the President is morally reprehensible, that he 
is reckless, that he has violated the trust of the American people, les-
sened their esteem for the office of President and dishonored the office 
which they have entrusted him, but that it does not rise to the level of 
impeachment . . . . I cannot in good conscience [agree].539 
Proponent after proponent of impeachment and conviction 
echoed the claim that the president had diminished the office. 
Representative Christopher Cox insisted that impeachment 
was necessary so that the nation could “once again respect the 
institution of the presidency.”540 In the Senate, Richard Lugar 
insisted that 
[o]ur President must be strong because a President personifies the 
rule of law that he is sworn to uphold and protect. We must believe 
him and trust him if we are to follow him. His influence on domestic 
and foreign policies comes from that trust, which a lifetime of words, 
deeds, and achievements has built. President Clinton has betrayed 
that trust.541 
His colleagues echoed these sentiments, insisting that the 
president ought to have good character542 and worrying about 
what effect Clinton’s conduct would have on “the moral health 
 
 536. 145 CONG. REC. 2376–77 (1999).  
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 540. Id. at 28,043.  
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of the Nation.”543 Senator Frist was concerned that Clinton’s 
conduct would “corrode the respect we all have for the Office of 
President,”544 and Senator Grassley lamented “the collapse of 
the President’s moral authority.”545 And Senator Hagel insisted 
that “President Clinton’s conduct has debased his office and vi-
olated the soul of justice—truth. He has thereby debased and 
violated the American people.”546 
Impeachment supporters in the press made similar argu-
ments. Conservative commentator William Bennett declared, 
“Bill Clinton is a reproach. He has defiled the office of the pres-
idency . . . .”547 The New York Post declared that Clinton “has 
debased his office,”548 and the Las Vegas Review Journal sug-
gested that the president’s “whimper[ing]” during the whole af-
fair suggested that “one more article should be added to that 
referral. The Constitution allows the office of the presidency to 
be occupied only by an adult.”549 The Columbus Dispatch in-
sisted that Clinton “has soiled the honorable office to which he 
was elected by the people.”550 And the Daily Oklahoman sol-
emnly intoned, “More than ever, America needs leaders who 
will stand for righteousness.”551 
There is a certain irony in the arguments marshaled by the 
advocates of impeachment and conviction. They were concerned 
that Clinton made the office too small—that he lessened the es-
teem in which it was held, that he destroyed public respect for 
and trust in the presidency, that he “debased” and “defiled” it. 
But a focus on impeachability as assassinability allows us to 
see that this concern was precisely backwards. Caesar and 
Charles were assassinable because they attempted to make 
their offices too big. They assumed to themselves despotic pow-
ers inconsistent with the constitutional order. They were ty-
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rants, which is to say that they reduced their formerly free 
countrymen to the status of slaves. They waged wars—and not 
just “culture wars”—against their own people. Even the argu-
ments against Lincoln and Johnson—though mistaken—were 
that they usurped authority not properly belonging to them. 
Clinton was not properly impeachable because there was no 
credible allegation that he did any such thing. Diminishment or 
debasement of the office may render one a bad president, un-
worthy of reelection or of the approbation of history. But it is 
not assassinable, and therefore not impeachable—and, once 
again, the procedural safeguards of the Constitution led to the 
correct result.552 
This is, however, not to suggest that “purely private” con-
duct by the president (if it is even truly possible for a sitting 
president to engage in “purely private” conduct) could never 
form the basis for an impeachable offense. Judge Posner offers 
the following hypothetical: suppose that President Clinton, “us-
ing none of the resources of his office and so being innocent of 
any misuse of Presidential power, had killed Monica Lewinsky 
with his bare hands in order to prevent her from cooperating 
with the Independent Counsel.”553 Surely, Posner concludes, 
this would be impeachable, for “Americans will not be ruled by 
a Nero or a Caligula.”554 Indeed, and it bears noting that Cali-
gula was assassinated,555 and Nero committed suicide facing 
assassination556—history of which the Founding generation 
was well aware.557 In fact, even sexual misconduct could rise to 
the level of the assassinable. It was the rape of Lucretia by Sex-
tus Tarquinius, the son of the king Tarquinius Superbus, that 
convinced Junius Brutus and Publius Valerius to lead the re-
volt against the Tarquin monarchy and establish the Roman 
Republic,558 a story that, as we have seen, was well known to 
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the Founding generation.559 The unbridled pursuit of personal 
interest by those in power is a hallmark of tyranny.560 Franklin 
and his compatriots believed in the justness of the assassina-
tions of Caligula and the Tarquins (and the attempted assassi-
nation of Nero), as much as they believed in the justness of the 
killing of Caesar and Charles. All of those cases involved ag-
grandizement of the office, whether for political or personal 
reasons. There is simply no reason to believe that Clinton’s be-
havior did, and that is why—with the exception of a few people 
like Ann Coulter—it seems grossly disproportionate to even 
think of justifying assassination in Clinton’s case. And for that 
reason, the Senate was right to acquit him. 
  CONCLUSION   
Ann Coulter was correct561 that, in British law, impeach-
ment could—and not infrequently did—carry the death penal-
ty.562 The American Constitution consciously broke with this 
tradition563 by declaring that “Judgment in Cases of Impeach-
ment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States.”564 But this change did not 
wholly sever the connection between impeachment and death. 
Under the American Constitution, impeachment is political 
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death.565 Indeed, it can even be political death without possibil-
ity of resurrection, should the Senate choose to exercise its au-
thority to make disqualification to future office a penalty upon 
conviction. Benjamin Franklin drew attention to this link in 
the Philadelphia Convention, when he highlighted the role of 
presidential impeachability as a means of avoiding presidential 
assassination.566 
This Article has attempted to unpack Franklin’s enigmatic 
and provocative statement. It suggests that the Constitution 
maintains the link between impeachment and death insofar as 
assassinability provides the substantive criterion for presiden-
tial impeachability. The link is severed, however, insofar as the 
Constitution attempts to preclude actual assassination by pro-
ceduralizing the removal of the chief magistrate. Impeachment 
and conviction lead to political death, but no more—procedure 
tames blood lust. 
This Article looked to Caesar and Charles I to understand 
both the substantive criteria for, and the procedural problems 
with, the assassination of an “obnoxious” (to use Franklin’s 
word) chief magistrate. It then used this analysis to develop 
substantive criteria for impeachment and to explain the proce-
dural virtues of the Constitution’s impeachment process, vir-
tues that were highlighted in the correct results of the only two 
presidential impeachment trials in American history, and vir-
tues that were obviously and sorely lacking in John Wilkes 
Booth’s decision to circumvent impeachment procedures.567 
 
 565. But see supra note 23 (providing a caveat).  
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But it may perhaps be objected that the analysis presented 
here proves too much. Having argued that the two presidential 
impeachment trials rightly ended in acquittal, the question 
naturally arises: Would any American president have been 
properly impeachable on this view? Although a full analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article, I submit that Richard Nixon 
was. The three articles of impeachment adopted by the House 
Judiciary Committee charged him with obstruction of justice 
with regard to the Watergate break-in; using federal agencies 
(including the FBI and the IRS) to spy on, harass, and intimi-
date his political enemies; and defying congressional subpoenas 
in the course of the impeachment inquiry.568 The Watergate 
break-in was not some piece of petty burglary—it was a raid on 
the offices of the Democratic National Committee “for the pur-
pose of securing political intelligence,” in the words of the im-
peachment articles.569 By participating in the cover-up, Nixon 
made himself party to an attempt by his allies to use the levers 
of power to keep him in power. Likewise, the allegation that 
Nixon used federal agencies to go after his political enemies in-
volved the use of power in an attempt to entrench power. 
Viewed this way, Nixon’s behavior has less in common with 
Clinton’s—despite the superficial similarity of both being 
charged with obstruction of justice—and more in common with 
the First Triumvirate’s attempts to consolidate its power570 and 
Charles’s attempts to circumvent institutions meant to check 
royal power.571 Nixon, like Caesar and Charles, sought to ag-
grandize his office, arrogating to himself new powers and using 
them to entrench himself in office. His vision of the presidency 
was too big, not too small.572 Nixon’s behavior was constitution-
subversive—and therefore tyrannical—in a way that neither 
Johnson’s nor Clinton’s was. 
As we have seen, it is this conception of tyranny, arising 
out of the subversion of the constitution and the accompanying 
destruction of republican liberty, that the Founding generation 
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regarded as substantively justifying assassination. But assas-
sination was disruptive at best and counterproductive at worst. 
Moreover, the Founders were deeply aware of individuals’ cog-
nitive limitations. They sought a less disruptive, more epistem-
ically humble means of removing obnoxious chief executives 
than assassination, and they created one in the constitutional 
process of impeachment. 
